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Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Interstate Waters Jurisprudence
Jamison E. Colburn†

“Interstate waters have been a font of controversy since the founding of the Nation.” 1

States’ interests in interstate waters have defied stout efforts to clarify them. From the
time of its first equitable decree, the bare idea that the Supreme Court could resolve an interstate
fight over a flowing river has been uncontroversial. 2 Reaffirmations have been confident, even
poetic. 3 But over the past century, as the Court refined its understanding of federal judge-made
law’s limits, 4 the theory that Article III grants authority to delineate states’ rights and duties over
shared waters has become an increasingly prominent and problematic anomaly. Prominent
because of the growing complexity of our water disputes; problematic for its substitution of an
esoteric history of remedial discretion—and the search for law’s place therein—for workable
legal standards applicable in any forum where an interstate waters dispute arises. This article
offers a new synthesis grounded in the Court’s voluminous work on these interests and the hope
that they may be better sorted and protected in our legal system as it has evolved.

Joseph H. Goldstein Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Penn State University. My thanks to Tara Grove and
Noah Hall for terrific comments and conversations on a prior draft and to Jay Austin for discussions of a more
summary, introductory piece that appears in the Environmental Law Reporter.
1
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 98 (1992) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
2
See, e.g., L. Ward Bannister, Interstate Rights in Interstate Streams in the Arid West, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 960, 978
(1922) (“Nothing is more axiomatic in our federal constitution than that the states are equal in rank and equal in
economic opportunity.”).
3
See, e.g., New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931) (“A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure. It
offers a necessity of life that must be rationed among those who have power over it. . . . Both States have real and
substantial interests that must be reconciled as best they may . . . without quibbling over formulas.”).
4
See O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 85-89 (1994) (reviewing cases).
†
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Article III’s judicial federalism began from landmarks like Chisholm v. Georgia, 5 Martin
v. Hunter’s Lessee, 6 and Cohens v. Virginia. 7 But it matured at milestones like Gibbons v.
Ogden, 8 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 9 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 10 and
others where the contours of federal power over states’ interests in interstate waters were set. 11
Equitable remedial discretion has long animated Article III scholars. 12 Indeed, it has long been
the basis of appeals to ‘law of the river’ on interstate waters, law that is mystical and ineffable. 13
But this has kept federal courts locked in an unstable tension between the Constitution’s

2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 449 (1793) (construing the scope of the Court’s original jurisdiction over “all cases . . . in which
a state shall be a party”). See John V. Orth, The Judicial Power of the United States: The Eleventh Amendment in
American History 12-14 (1987) (quoting U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2, and its construction in Chisholm).
6
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 342, 251-52 (1816) (construing the Court’s appellate jurisdiction to review and revise
state court judgments).
7
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (construing the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over appeals of a state’s criminal
conviction). See Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98
Yale L.J. 1, 15-39 (1988).
8
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (holding that state-granted monopolies of shipping in interstate waters were invalid
as against federal licenses to operate).
9
53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852) (holding that federal statute enacted in 1789 made provision for state laws requiring
competent local pilots to be used in navigating local waters and that Pennsylvania law fit within that valid savings
of state law requirements).
10
54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1852) (holding in original jurisdiction action brought by state that bridge over interstate
river which obstructed shipping traffic was actionable injury to upstream state and that relief would be the
“abatement” of the bridge by order of the Court).
11
See also Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan (1845); Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847); The Genesee Chief, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851). The Nineteenth-century expansion of the admiralty jurisdiction on the basis of “locality”
(and of Congress’s legislative powers in turn) is traced in David Robertson’s careful Admiralty and Federalism. See
David W. Robertson, Admiralty and Federalism (1971); see also Note—From Judicial Grant to Legislative Power:
The Admiralty Clause in the Nineteenth Century, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1214 (1954).
12
See Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 59 B.C. L. Rev. 217 (2018); Kristin A. Collins, “A Considerable
Surgical Operation”: Article III, Equity, and Judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts, 60 Duke L.J. 249 (2010); David
Sloss, Constitutional Remedies for Statutory Violations, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 354 (2004); David Crump, The Twilight Zone
of the Erie Doctrine: Is There Really a Different Choice of Equitable Remedies in the “Court a Block Away”?, 1991
Wis. L. Rev. 1233; David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 548-50 (1985); Robert F.
Nagle, Separation of Powers the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 661 (1978); Walter E.
Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1532, 1532-33 (1972) (discussing
Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)); Alfred L. Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 1109
(1969) (hereafter Hill, Remedies).
13
See David Owen, Where the Water Goes: Life and Death Along the Colorado River 24 (2017) (noting that
invocations of the ‘Law of the River’ refer to a “complex but loosely defined and minimally circumscribed body of
rules, precedents, habits, treaties, customs and compacts that isn’t written down all in one place,” but which is
invoked “almost any time two water users disagree about who’s entitled to what”).
5
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federalism and its separation of powers. 14 The categorical interests states claim equally
according to the Court evoke timeless notions of sovereignty. 15 Since Massachusetts v. EPA, 16
however, an outpouring of work on state standing under Article III has revealed deep fault
lines. 17 State standing has an inordinately complex past, 18 one that unfortunately has become
entangled in today’s bitter politics. Rethinking the Court’s work on interstate waters, and
derivatively its work on states’ remediable injuries there, thus, means reckoning with a large
canon of opinions and judgments. 19 Part I considers the legacy of dispute resolution in the
Court’s original jurisdiction while Part II compares an equally deep legacy of appellate cases

See Morley, supra note 12, at 219-24; Collins, supra note 12, at 252-55; Hill, Remedies, supra note 12.
See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122
Harv. L. Rev. 1791, 1868 (2009) (observing that “[s]tates are not sources of ends in the same sense as are persons.
Instead, states are systems of shared practices and institutions within which communities of persons establish and
advance their ends.”) (quoting Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations 180 (1979)); cf. New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (“State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: Rather, federalism
secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.”).
16
549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007) (holding that states “are not normal litigants for purposes of invoking federal
jurisdiction” and relaxing at least two elements of standing doctrine for state plaintiffs).
17
See Seth Davis, The Private Rights of Public Governments, 94 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2091 (2019) (hereafter Davis,
Private Rights); Seth Davis, The New Public Standing, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 1229 (2019); F. Andrew Hessick, QuasiSovereign Standing, 94 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1927 (2019); Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law
Litigation in an Age of Polarization, 97 Tex. L. Rev. 43 (2018); James Pfander, Standing, Litigable Interest, and
Article III’s Case-or-Controversy Requirement, 65 UCLA L. Rev. 170 (2018); Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue
the United States?, 101 Cornell L. Rev. 851 (2016); Shannon M. Roesler, State Standing to Challenge Federal
Authority in the Modern Administrative State, 91 Wash. L. Rev. 637 (2016); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The
Fragmentation of Standing, 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1061, 1081-84 (2015); Ann Woolhandler, Governmental Sovereignty
Actions, 23 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 209 (2014); Katherine Mims Crocker, Note—Securing Sovereign State Standing,
97 Va. L. Rev. 2051 (2011); Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights than Ordinary Citizens?
Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing Test for States, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1701 (2008); Robert V. Percival,
Massachusetts v. EPA: Escaping the Common Law’s Growing Shadow, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 111.
18
See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 Va. L. Rev. 287 (1995); James E. Pfander,
Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 555 (1994) (hereafter
Pfander, “Rethinking”); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign
Immunity, 98 Yale L.J. 1 (1988).
19
Three indispensable references to this end include Note—The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme
Court, 11 Stan. L. Rev. 665 (1959), Vincent L. McKusick, Discretionary Gatekeeping: The US Supreme Court’s
Management of Its Original Jurisdiction Docket Since 1961, 45 Me. L. Rev. 185 (1993), and James G. Mandilk,
Note—The Modification of Decrees in the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 125 Yale L. J. 1880 (2016).
14
15
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involving interstate waters. Part III charts a convergence of those two streams and offers a
synthesis grounded in basic choice of law methods.
I. DOCTRINAL CONFLUENCE: STATE DIGNITY, EQUITY, AND SHARED WATERS
The Supreme Court’s interstate waters jurisprudence stems from what we know as the
states’ equal sovereignty. 20 Many of the benchmarks have arisen within the Court’s original
jurisdiction over “controversies” between two or more states and are extensions of the judgemade doctrine that the Nation “was and is a union of States, equal in power, dignity and
authority.” 21 But this doctrine is not found in the Constitution’s text, its historical roots are
tangled, and it generates considerable friction with other structural principles that clearly are
embedded in the Constitution. 22 In short, the Court’s dignitarian approach to interstate waters has
created a turbulent doctrinal confluence that has resisted organization.

A. Sovereign into Quasi-Sovereign Interests: Of Dignified Tribunals
The Constitution, Article III, Section 2, vests original jurisdiction in the Court over
“Controversies between two or more States,” a jurisdiction that has always been exclusive by
statute. 23 For any claim that must be staked there, it is the only forum unless and until Congress

Interstate waters have featured in several of the Court’s “equal footing” doctrine landmarks, including Pollard’s
Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223 (1845), Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 333-34 (1877), Illinois
Central R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 451-59 (1892), and Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894). See Phillips Petro.
Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 473-76 (1988) (reviewing cases); Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114
Mich. L. Rev. 1207, 1210 (2016) (finding at the core of cases like Pollard’s Lessee and United States v. Louisiana,
363 U.S. 1, 16 (1960), a “historic tradition that all the States enjoy equal sovereignty”).
21
Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911).
22
See Litman, supra note 20, at 1212.
23
See U.S. Const., art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a). The Judiciary Act of 1789 first provided exclusive original
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court over “all controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party,” with some
exceptions. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, Sess. I, ch. 20, at § 13. In 1948, Congress trimmed the exclusivity to its
present scope—controversies between “two or more states.” See Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of
Article III, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1569, 1573-1602 (1990).
20
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changes a statute first enacted in 1789. 24 The Court has repeatedly explained that this jurisdiction
requires an injury of a certain kind and magnitude which follows from the sort of interests
properly protected there. 25 Boundary disputes—many involving interstate waters—were long the
exemplar. 26 Beyond claims for territory, though, specifying the requisite injury has been a
challenge. 27 Territorial disputes are zero-sum contests where one state’s gain is another’s loss. 28
The pliant, often cryptic quality and extent of waters, however, make whatever injuries result
from their over- or misuse considerably less forthright. And arising in equity as they do, the
Court’s procedures and means of decision have seemed uniquely bound to own its discretion. 29
As the Court has struggled with the claims that states have asserted over time, however, its
signals to would-be litigants have gone from feint to crossed.

Several dissents from denials of leave to file have emphasized the point. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S.
Ct. 1034, 1035 (2016) (Thomas and Alito, JJ., dissenting); Louisiana v. Mississippi, 488 U.S. 990, 990 (1988) (White,
Stevens, Scalia, JJ., dissenting); California v. West Virginia, 454 U.S. 1027, 1027 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25
See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 18, at 446-79.
26
Many of the Court’s boundary disputes have been so contentious and protracted precisely because waters so
often serve as interstate boundaries. Texas’ and Oklahoma’s Red River rivalry is emblematic. See Arthur Stiles, The
Gradient Boundary—The Line Between Texas and Oklahoma Along the Red River, 30 Tex. L. Rev. 306, 308-12 (1952)
(recounting that, following decades of litigation in the Supreme Court, field surveyors were forced to follow the
Court’s decree to the letter as they located boundary comprised of a topographical gradient). Indeed, waterboundary disputes have involved recourse to specialized doctrines for dealing with hyper-litigious parties. See, e.g.,
New Jersey v. Delaware, 552 U.S. 597, 603-06 (2008) (reviewing two prior iterations of same boundary dispute
then pending to narrow what could be contested); New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749-56 (2001) (applying
“judicial estoppel” to New Hampshire’s attempt to reopen boundary settlement with Maine).
27
See Davis, supra note 17, at 2098-2100; Fallon, supra note 17, at 1080-84; Crocker, supra note 17, at 2056-66;
Mank, supra note 17, at 1756-75; Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 18, at 397-433.
28
There is arguably no more sovereign attribute than territory. See Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657,
726 (1838). Yet even in the Court’s boundary dispute docket it has employed equitable discretion in lieu of pure
legal decision. See, e.g., New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 810-12 (1998) (adjusting state boundary to fit
existing buildings wholly in one state or the other despite boundary’s having been found precisely as dissecting
buildings).
29
By the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, as well as its own Article III authority, the Court possesses considerable
discretion over the rules of evidence and procedure to be followed in its own proceedings. See Sibbach v. Wilson,
312 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1941); 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a); see also Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of Judicial
Process: Special Masters in the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 625, 642-58 (2002);
James E. Beaver, Common Law vs. International Law Adjective Rules in the Original Jurisdiction, 20 Hast. L.J. 1, 4-5
(1968).
24
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1. Dignified Tribunal: A Forum of State-State Controversies. The Court’s very first
encounter with a state seeking to vindicate special interests in shared waters came in
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. 30 The evidence showed that the bridge at
Wheeling, Virginia (now West Virginia) obstructed the largest steamboats’ passage up the Ohio
River to Pittsburgh, where the state, railroads, shippers, and other investors had established a
substantial port. 31 Completion of the bridge in December 1849 came just after Pennsylvania’s
filing in July.32 Virginia specifically endorsed the bridge by statute in 1850 as the state was
united in its support of Wheeling’s bid to become a hub city on the river. 33 But Justice McLean’s
opinion for the majority declared the bridge an “injury” to Pennsylvania that entitled it to
equitable relief. 34 McLean’s opinion studiously avoided stating the source of law by which the
bridge was judged. 35 Pennsylvania had argued that Congress had repeatedly declared the Ohio a
“public highway of commerce,” 36 but the Court’s opinion grounded its authority to abate this
injury in the complaining state’s “dignity” 37 and the Court’s own equity powers under Article III

54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1852) (“Wheeling Bridge I”). Initial proceedings charged a “commissioner” with factfinding on Pennsylvania’s pleadings. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 50 U.S. 647, 658-59
(1850). The first suspension bridge of its kind, the footings were all in Virginia soil from the Wheeling shore to
then-Zane’s Island 500+ feet to the west. See Elizabeth Brand Monroe, The Wheeling Bridge Case: Its Significance
in American Law and Technology 42-47 (1992).
31
See 54 U.S. at 558. Wheeling’s mid-century population of about 13,000 was dwarfed by Pittsburgh’s—which was
also the much larger commercial hub. See Monroe, supra note 30, at 30-38.
32
See Elizabeth B. Monroe, Spanning the Commerce Clause: The Wheeling Bridge Case, 1850-1856, 32 Amer. J.
Legal Hist. 265, 278-79 (1988).
33
See 54 U.S. at 558-59. Virginia’s statute was enacted in January 1850, amending the bridge company’s charter to
include the bridge’s actual elevation, location, and dimensions. Id. at 279-80 & n.62. Although Pittsburgh’s shipping
interests led the fight against Wheeling’s bridge, its railroad interests were also active opponents, recognizing
Wheeling as a competitor in the east-west Ohio Valley trade. See Monroe, supra note 30, at 48-49.
34
See 54 U.S. at 576-78. The Ohio’s being a shared river among the states distinguished Wheeling’s bridge from an
earlier case, Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829), where a minor tributary of the
Delaware River—located wholly within Delaware—had been dammed and the Court held that state law protected
the dam from self-help by an aggrieved captain. See Wheeling Bridge I, 54 U.S. at 566.
35
See 54 U.S. at 579-80. (Taney, J., dissenting). The Virginia statute was an amendment to the company’s charter
that directed the bridge meet the parameters which had already been achieved in design and construction. See
Monroe, supra note 30, at 47-49.
36
See Wheeling Bridge I, 54 U.S. at 520.
37
54 U.S. at 560.
30
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and the Judiciary Act of 1789. 38 According to the Court, because Pennsylvania was not suing “in
virtue of its sovereignty,” 39 nor had it claimed anything “connected with the exercise of its
sovereignty,” 40 but rather had only sought the “protection of its property” in the port and
associated infrastructure of and about Pittsburgh, 41 its injury was redressable in equity. 42 Chief
Justice Taney’s dissent took issue with every one of these premises, 43 with one exception: that
“[t]he State, in this controversy, ha[d] the same rights as an individual, and nothing more.” 44
Then, as now, the precise nature of the state’s interest and injury—sovereign yet seemingly
derivative of the tangible harms actually being suffered—challenged the Court.

In quoting the Act of 1789, the Court first reasoned that “Chancery” jurisdiction had been conferred with the
limitation that “suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the courts of the United States, in any case where
plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be had at law.” 54 U.S. at 563 (quoting Act of Sept. 24, 1789, Sess. I,
ch. 20, at § 16). It then inferred that because, in “exercising this jurisdiction the courts of the Union are not limited
by the chancery system adopted by any State,” nor prohibited from it in “a State where no court of chancery has
been established,” id., “where relief can be given by the English chancery, similar relief may be given by the courts
of the Union.” Id. at 564. What the majority did not do is claim that federal common law governed, see id. at 564
(“The common law could be made part of our federal system only be legislative adoption.”), or that a federal
statute had prohibited obstructions like the bridge.
39
54 U.S. at 559.
40
54 U.S. at 561.
41
This sort of injury, the majority declared, was “irreparable” by suit at common law and thus sufficiently suited to
equity. See 54 U.S. at 560-62. It thereby denied that Pennsylvania’s complaint was actually a claim in public
nuisance—a common law crime which the Court had long held beyond Article III, see id. at 563 (discussing
Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212 (1818))—and that the bridge was forbidden by law. See id. at 580
(Taney, C.J., dissenting). Ultimately, Pennsylvania’s injury was pled and argued in terms of lost revenues from the
freight tonnage excluded and from sea-going vessels not being built in Pittsburgh. See Monroe, supra note 30, at
60-64.
42
See 54 U.S. at 578 (announcing that if raising the bridge or “or some other plan shall not be adopted which shall
relieve the navigation from obstruction, on or before the 1st day of February next, the bridge must be abated”).
After a further two months of argument and submissions, the Court left the defendants with eleven months to
raise the bridge to an elevation of at least 111 feet over the middle 300 feet of the river’s channel. See id. at 627.
43
See 54 U.S. at 579-93 (Taney, C.J., dissenting). Taney argued that “although the suit is brought in this court, the
law of the case and the rights of the parties [should be] the same as if it had been brought in the Circuit Court of
Virginia [the federal trial court at the time], in which the bridge is situated.” Id. at 579. Because no federal law
declared the bridge a nuisance and because the bridge was not a nuisance by Virginia law, he argued, “[w]e can
derive no jurisdiction. . . .” Id. at 580. In response, the majority declared only that “[t]he fact that the bridge
constitutes a nuisance is ascertained by measurement.” Id. at 568 (emphasis added). Taney also argued that, even
assuming the bridge was an actionable nuisance, the balance of equities should favor the bridge—which he noted
had cost more than $200,000 to build—over Pennsylvania’s “speculative, questionable, and at most,
inconsiderable loss.” See id. at 589-90.
44
54 U.S. at 579 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
38
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An important coda came four years later when the Court confronted Congress’s
intervention. 45 In August 1852, barely three months after the decree, Congress enacted a statute
declaring the bridge to be a “lawful structure[]”, “anything in the law or laws of the United States
to the contrary notwithstanding.” 46 By the time the full Court assembled to rehear the matter in
the December 1854 Term, times had changed. The bridge had been blown down by a storm in
May. 47 Justice McKinley’s death left his seat to President Pierce’s appointment of southerner
(and eventual Confederate) John Campbell. 48 An era of road, railroad, and bridge building was
dawning. 49 And Justice Grier, sitting in chambers during the Court’s summer recess, had
enjoined the bridge’s reconstruction and ordered the company to answer Pennsylvania’s renewed
application for relief—which the company had refused to do. 50 The full Court reversed Grier,
holding that the original decree, because it was “executory,” 51 left Congress free to change the
underlying law such that there was “no longer any interference with the enjoyment of the public
right inconsistent with law.” 52 The Court fractured over what to do about challenges to its
authority, 53 as well as about Congress’s power to change the entitlements to the river. 54

See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421 (1856) (“Wheeling Bridge II”).
Pennsylvania, 59 U.S. at 429 (quoting 10 Stat. 112 (1852)).
47
See Monroe, supra note 30, at 150.
48
See Note, supra note 19, at 1228 n.105.
49
See Monroe, supra note 30, at 163-76.
50
See Pennsylvania, 59 U.S. at 422-23.
51
59 U.S. at 431.
52
59 U.S. at 432.
53
The 1854 statute was regarded by at least two justices as some form of affront to the Court’s power to hear and
decide cases and controversies. See 59 U.S. at 449 (Grier, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 440-42 (McLean, J.,
dissenting). The contempt charges for the company’s refusal to appear split the Court 5-4 (the dissenters favoring
contempt sanctions included Justice Nelson—who otherwise wrote for the majority). See id. at 436. The two-anda-half-hour session spent announcing the different opinions was reportedly “stormy.” See Carl B. Swisher, 5 History
of the Supreme Court of the United States: The Taney Period, 1836-1864, 418 (1974).
54
See Swisher, supra note 53, at 415-22 (noting later bridge cases marked by the same uncertainties).
45
46
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Equally conspicuous was disagreement over the legal grounds of the original decree. 55
Justice Nelson’s majority opinion made the curious assertion that the original decree was granted
because the bridge “was in conflict with . . . acts of congress,” 56 a claim Pennsylvania had
argued but which Justice McLean’s opinion in Wheeling Bridge I had carefully avoided. 57 Justice
Wayne’s dissent cast the original decree as having declared the bridge a nuisance that denied
Pennsylvania its constitutional right of “navigating the Ohio River at all stages of its waters.” 58
And Justice Daniel reiterated his argument from his dissent in Wheeling Bridge I that the Court
lacked jurisdiction in the matter. 59 All of this is notable for how the Wheeling Bridge saga
foreshadowed the Court’s century-long struggle with its interstate waters controversies: as an
equitable action with unparalleled potential for confusion.
As time passed the Court came to recognize Wheeling Bridge through Nelson’s gloss. 60
The irony, given how many times Congress had been invited but had declined either to fund a
In five opinions and two separate orders the justices split their votes on the three principal motions argued: the
validity and effect of Congress’s 1852 statute; the validity of Justice Grier’s orders in chambers; and the status of
the contempt charges against the defendants. See 59 U.S. at 422-27.
56
See 59 U.S. at 430 (“This being the view of the case taken by a majority of the court, they found no difficulty in
arriving at the conclusion, that the obstruction of the navigation of the river, by the bridge, was a violation of the
right secured to the public by the constitution and laws of congress . . . .”).
57
The case would have been much simpler had a federal statute prohibited the span. In describing the river and
Congress’s many statutes and appropriations surrounding its improvement and navigation, McLean’s opinion
prefaced the discussion by noting “[t]hat the Ohio River is navigable, is a historical fact, which all courts may
recognize.” 54 U.S. at 561. McLean’s answer to the Chief Justice’s denial that there existed “any act of Congress
regulating the height of bridges over the river,” id. at 580 (Taney, C.J., dissenting), was that Congress had not
legislated as much “in terms.” See id. at 565. This was the same Court, through Chief Justice Taney, that had just
expanded the admiralty jurisdiction of the lower federal courts to the Great Lakes in The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh,
53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851), in part because of its perception of admiralty jurisdiction’s importance to a state’s
commercial development and the western states’ lack of jurisdictional waters absent the expansion. See id. at 454.
Taney’s interpretation of the legislation (legislation that Justice Joseph Story had drafted) was part of a grand
expansion throughout the Nineteenth century of the admiralty jurisdiction to all “navigable” waters. See
Robertson, supra note 11, at 104-22. The legal significance of the Ohio’s navigability and the states’ interests
therein, thus, were hardly matters that the Court would have felt compelled to leave to Congress.
58
See 59 U.S. at 450 (Wayne, J., dissenting).
59
See 59 U.S. at 453 (Daniel, J., concurring); 54 U.S. at 594-97 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
60
See, e.g., South Carolina v. Georgia et al., 93 U.S. 4, 12 (1876); Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1,
15-17 (1888); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 227 (1900); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 518 (1906); Cuyler v.
Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438-39 & n.7 (1981).
55
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federal bridge at Wheeling or to legislate, 61 was lost. But other state bills would arrive at the
Court’s original docket before century’s end. 62 Wisconsin would allege an injury to its use of the
St. Louis River, which serves as the Minnesota-Wisconsin border at its confluence with Lake
Superior, caused by Duluth’s canal cut that had the effect of diverting the river’s flow. 63 This
time the Court denied relief on grounds paralleling Wheeling Bridge II: Minnesota’s and
Congress’s tacit legislative approval of Duluth’s canal. 64 The stage had been set for state dignitybased equity jurisdiction to emerge into federal prerogatives over interstate waters.
2. The Equitable Action. Twin holdings in 1901 and 1902 confirmed that states could sue
each other in the Court seeking equitable relief against the over- and misuse of their shared
waters. 65 Complaining states had alleged injuries being caused in upstream states 66 and the Court
declared its readiness to compel upstream state responses as warranted. 67 It is worth noting that,
as it had in both Wheeling Bridge and Wisconsin, the Court regarded the waters as shared

See Monroe, supra note 30, at 30-38, 70-71.
See South Carolina, 93 U.S. at 5; Wisconsin v. Duluth, 96 U.S. 379 (1878).
63
See Wisconsin, 96 U.S. at 381; see also South Carolina, 93 U.S. at 11-12 (describing channel cuts improving
Georgia’s part of the river to the detriment of South Carolina’s).
64
Cf. Wisconsin, 96 U.S. at 387 (“If, then, Congress, in the exercise of a lawful authority, has adopted and is
carrying out a system of harbor improvements at Duluth, this court can have no lawful authority to forbid the
work.”). The Court was emphatic—if not particularly precise—that “[w]hen Congress appropriates $10,000 to
improve, protect, and secure [Duluth’s] canal, this court can have no power to require it to be filled up and
obstructed.” Id. at 388; see also South Carolina, 93 U.S. at 13-14 (holding that an appropriation for “the
improvement of the harbor of Savanah” was sufficient Congressional endorsement of engineering choices
advantaging Georgia’s over South Carolina’s use of Savanah River to defeat the claim).
65
See Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902).
66
In Missouri, after a lengthy review of its precedents, the majority held that “if the health and comfort of the
inhabitants of a state are threatened, the state is the proper party to represent and defend them.” Missouri, 180
U.S. at 241. In Kansas, the Court held that “proof should be made as to whether Colorado is herself actually
threatening to wholly exhaust the flow of the Arkansas river in Kansas.” Kansas, 185 U.S. at 147.
67
Cf. Kansas, 185 U.S. at 145 (finding Kansas’ bill of complaint “sufficient to present the question as to the power
of one state of the Union to wholly deprive another of the benefit of water from a river rising in the former and, by
nature, flowing into and through the latter,” supplying the Court with jurisdiction); Missouri, 180 U.S. at 241
(declaring that it would be “objectionable, and, indeed, impossible, for the court to anticipate by definition what
controversies can and what cannot be brought within the original jurisdiction of th[e] court”). Chief Justice Fuller’s
dissent in Missouri argued that redressing such an injury would entail coercing “the lawmaking function of the
state of Illinois.” See id. at 249-50 (Fuller, C.J., Harlan & White, JJ., dissenting).
61
62
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wholes—not as so many territorial slices border to border. 68 This was important legally given the
Court’s conception of state sovereignty, then as now. 69 The complainant’s dignity, mirroring that
of the defendant(s), overcame the Court’s considerable inhibitions 70 to compelling states to
regulate their residents in order to protect these resources. 71 The Court would go on to clarify in
1907 that states’ interests would be subject to the Court’s own “equitable apportionment of
benefits between the . . . states resulting from the flow of the [water].” 72 This divisionary
solution was designedly open-ended, potentially reaching anything about the waters that could be
advantageous. 73 And it has since been turned toward resources besides the flow itself. 74

This was at least in part the rejection of an opinion issued by Attorney General Judson Harmon (the “Harmon
doctrine”) regarding a territorial sovereign’s right, in Harmon’s estimation, to deplete fully the flow of any water
rising within it. See Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred Years Later: Buried, Not Praised, 36
Nat. Res. J. 549, 557-69 (1996).
69
The Court’s dignitarian conception of state sovereignty has elevated immunity from suit to the core of the
states’ sovereign attributes. See Litman, supra note 20; Nagle, supra note 12, at 681-706.
70
See Kansas, 185 U.S. at 140-41 (observing that the “Constitution made some things justiciable ‘which were not
known as such at the common law’”) (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890)); cf. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The
Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 523 (1954) (noting that even after a finding of
prohibited state action, federal courts have always been reluctant to remediate abuses of state authority). The
Court has repeatedly held that the federal government may not compel states to act upon their own citizens. See
Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107 (1861), overruled, Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 226-27
(1987); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 98 (1997); Nat’l Fed’n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebellius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
71
Justice Holmes had, by the time of Missouri v. Illinois and Kansas v. Colorado, famously reasoned that “[i]f the
state has a case at all, it is somewhat more certainly entitled to specific relief than a private party might be” when
vindicating its interests in the health and safety of its residents. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co. et al., 206 U.S. 230,
237 (1907) (emphasis added). Tennessee Copper was a state’s case against private defendants in a neighboring
state, however, and its ‘special solicitude’ for states has ever since remained an enigma within the Court’s standing
doctrines. See Mank, supra note 17, at 1775-80 (arguing that Tennessee Copper and Missouri support the Court’s
finding of state standing in Massachusetts v. EPA); Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 18, at 450-55 (tracing “police
power standing” to Tennessee Copper).
72
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 118 (1907). This was the same opinion in which the Court suggested (in dicta)
that Congress lacked Article I authority to legislate the parties’ rights to the river. See id. at 94-96.
73
In appraising the benefits being had from the Arkansas River, the Court weighed the disparity between an
extensive Colorado irrigation economy that had taken root in the valley beginning in the 1880s against what it
found to be a much weaker version in western Kansas. See Kansas, 206 U.S. at 107-14, 116-17. This reportedly
reinforced a sense on the ground that “[t]he first man that gets the water keeps it.” James E. Shernow, The Contest
for the “Nile of America”: Kansas v. Colorado (1907), 10(1) Grt. Plains Q. 48, 57-58 (1990).
74
See, e.g., Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon and Washington, 462 U.S. 1017, 1024 (1983) (holding that the “doctrine
of equitable apportionment is applicable” to dispute between states over management of anadromous fish); cf.
Hood ex rel. Miss. v. City of Memphis, 570 F.3d 625, 630 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that differences between aquifers
68
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The Court has entered four decrees: apportioning flows of the Laramie, Delaware, and
North Platte Rivers 75 and constraining Illinois’s diversions from Lake Michigan. 76 A fifth decree
interpreting and further specifying allocations made by an interrelated compact, federal statute,
and reservations, still controls the lower Colorado River. 77 And a sixth enjoined New York
City’s dumping in international waters at New Jersey’s behest because so much of the trash was
reaching New Jersey’s beaches. 78 Each decree addressed what, to the complainants, represented
a threat insulated from liability by “foreign” law. 79 Each is non-substitutionary, 80 mandatory, and
grew out of what the Court has called the states’ “real and substantial interests” that, when
rivalrous, “must be reconciled as best they may.” 81 Perhaps most importantly, each decree was
increasingly characteristic of the forum granting it. For the Supreme Court progressively
broadened states’ immunities from suit throughout the Twentieth century right up to—but not

and surface waters are of “no analytical significance” and that equitable apportionment of aquifer by the Supreme
Court was the appropriate forum and remedy).
75
See Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (Laramie); New Jersey v. New York et al., 283 U.S. 336 (1931)
(Delaware); Nebraska v. Wyoming et al., 325 U.S. 589 (1943) (North Platte).
76
See Wisconsin et al. v. Illinois et al., 278 U.S. 367, 420 (1929). Wisconsin was the coda to the 1907 denial of
Missouri’s case against the Chicago Sanitary Canal’s diversion of Lake Michigan the better to flush its sewage down
the Des Plaines, Illinois, and Mississippi rivers. See infra notes 174-81 and accompanying text. The Court’s decree
grew out of the complaining states’ interests in the navigability of the Great Lakes, see 278 U.S. at 420-21, but was
expressed like any other cap on consumptive use. See Wisconsin et al. v. Illinois et al., 281 U.S. 179, 201-02 (1930).
77
See Arizona v. California et al., 376 U.S. 340 (1964); see also Arizona v. California, 547 U.S. 150 (2006) (amending
1964 decree).
78
See New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473, 483 (1931). Notably, Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act
of 1899 (known as the Refuse Act) did not apply because the dumping was thought to be outside the territorial
jurisdiction reached by that statute. Id. at 476. The Court held that it had jurisdiction over the respondent and the
claims against it because of the situs of the harm. Id. at 482. The decree was held in abeyance for a “reasonable
time” to allow the city to devise other means of disposal. Id. at 483.
79
In each case the decree entered targeted particularized and proven practices, either imminent or completed,
and, in the diversion cases, specified mass limits to be observed. See Wyoming, 260 U.S. at 1-2; New Jersey, 283
U.S. at 805-07; Wisconsin, 281 U.S. at 201; Nebraska, 325 U.S. at 665-72; Arizona, 376 U.S. at 340-53. The decreed
mass limits in Wisconsin in effect reflected system interests. See Wisconsin, 278 U.S. at 408-11.
80
Equity’s signature has long been specific relief. See Theodore F.T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common
Law 677-80 (5th ed. 1956). The original jurisdiction waters decrees have been no exception and, because StateState controversies have been exclusive to the Supreme Court’s original docket by statute since the Founding,
there are no reported precedents in inferior courts adjudicating the claims adjudicated there.
81
New Jersey, 283 U.S. at 342.
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including—this docket. 82 There is no other forum today that can grant the kind of relief against
U.S. states that these decrees embody. 83 In explaining its decisions, though, the Court has
elaborated the grounds of this unique authority in increasingly uneven fashion even as the
demands on shared waters have grown more urgent, varied, and contentious. 84
3. Equity’s Burdens. Procedural and evidentiary rules are characteristically forum
specific. 85 For example, the Supreme Court has repeatedly and emphatically declared that a
complaining state must plead a “threatened invasion of rights . . . of serious magnitude” and
prove it by “clear and convincing evidence.” 86 Occasionally labeling them parens patriae
The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. In Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.
1 (1890), the Court declared that the Amendment’s bare text did not confine the immunity for which it stood and
held that a suit by a State’s own citizen was also barred from a federal court. Id. at 19-21. In In re New York, 256
U.S. 490, it extended this immunity to federal courts’ admiralty jurisdiction. Id. at 500. In Principality of Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934), it extended the immunity to suits brought by foreign states. Id. at 330. In Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), it held that Congress’s Article I powers could not abrogate state
immunity from suit in federal courts. Id. at 58-73. In Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), it held that Congress’s
Article I powers were insufficient to abrogate the immunity from suit in states’ own courts. Id. at 754-55. Yet the
Court has refused to immunize states from suits by one another or by the United States in its original jurisdiction.
See United States v. Louisiana, 389 U.S. 155 (1967); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); United States v.
Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646-47 (1892).
For “more than a century,” then, the Court has “invoked the tenets of strong purposivism to hold that the
Eleventh Amendment means far more than it says.” John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of
Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 Yale L.J. 1663, 1749 (2004). But its purposivism has never reached its own original
jurisdiction. See Kansas v. Colorado,533 U.S. 1, 7 (2001) (“In proper original actions, the Eleventh Amendment is no
barrier, for by its terms it applies only to suits by citizens against a State.”).
83
In Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019), the Court held that states are immune from private suits in
the courts of sibling states, overruling Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979). It found in the Constitution’s silence on
the issue a latent understanding that “took as given that States could not be haled involuntarily before each
other’s courts.” 139 S. Ct. at 1494.
84
See supra notes 229-46 and accompanying text.
85
See Beaver, supra note 29, at 12-37 (tracking the emergence of the Court’s “common law adjective rules” in the
original jurisdiction to its proclamation of August 1791 on equity procedures). Others of the Court’s rules have
come from its common law powers. See Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal
Jurisdictional Policy, and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86 Colum. L.
Rev. 1291, 1292-94 (1986) (describing a “continuous pattern of unnecessary self-restraint” by the Court following
its own practice rules of refusing appellate jurisdiction in many federal question “cases”).
86
See Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 315-17 (1984); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 669
(1931) (citing New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906)). The Court’s
most recent restatement of this standard in Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502 (2018), emphasized the division of
82
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interests, 87 however, the Court has insisted that these are the unique interests of the state—not
(just) those of its impacted residents. 88 And it has famously equivocated on states’ standing to
assert any such interests against the United States. 89
As to the interests themselves, little is certain. The oft-quoted opinion in Nebraska v.
Wyoming 90—naming factors by which to prioritize competing claims on over-appropriated
waters 91—was recently relegated in favor of a generic “equal right” to “reasonable use.” 92 And
yet, as malleable as such descriptions sound, their ties to one use in particular—irrigation—have
enfeebled them in the face of so many other interests in interstate waters in our Constitution’s
third century. 93 Their repetition by the Court, thus, frames a basic question: have they made a
law of interstate waters?

an “initial burden” for leave to file suit from the proofs required once the Court is moved to apply its factored
consideration of the competing interests. Id. at 2514-16. Note that the Court has held in other contexts that
burdens of proof are elements of any underlying entitlement, see Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 21213 (1939), and that, unless constitutionally required, they are subject to Congress’s (re)alignment. See Vance v.
Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1980).
87
See, e.g., South Carolina v. North Carolina, 558 U.S. 256, 266 (2010) (quoting New Jersey v. New York et al., 283
U.S. 336, 342 (1931); see also New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369, 371-74 (1953); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S.
125, 142 (1901).
88
See, e.g., New Jersey 345 U.S. at 372-73; North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 375 (1923).
89
In Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), the Court held that the state lacked standing to sue the United
States to vindicate its interests under the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 483. Yet, in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383,
U.S. 301 (1966), it held that states could sue the United States to protect interests under the Fifteenth
Amendment. Id. at 323-27. This has left states’ standing to sue the United States as parens patriae rather muddled.
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520-21 & n.17 (2007).
90
325 U.S. 589 (1945).
91
See Nebraska, 325 U.S. at 618 (citing Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494 (1922); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S.
517 (1931)) (observing that “[a]pportionment calls for the exercise of an informed judgment on a consideration” of
“physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water in the several sections of the river, the character
and rate of return flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of storage water, the practical effect of
wasteful uses on downstream areas, the damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to downstream
areas if a limitation is imposed”).
92
See Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502, 2513 (2018) (quoting United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S.
499, 505 (1945)); Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 184 (1982).
93
Cf. Charles F. Wilkinson, Crossing the Next Meridian: Land, Water, and the Future of the West 21-22 (1992)
(depicting irrigation and irrigated agriculture as a characteristic “Lord of Yesterday”). Many have isolated the
Nebraska factors, keyed as they are to irrigation claims, for attention. See, e.g., Kristen A. Linsley, Original Intent:
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B. Remedial Bootstraps: Equity Making the Law?
The Court’s jurisprudence has opened a considerable law-equity rift. It declares that
interstate compacts apportioning waters, unless unconstitutional, are binding law, 94 as are federal
statutes that allocate. 95 In Arizona v. California96 the Court was unequivocal on the point: it was
without authority to allocate waters contrary to the Boulder Canyon Project Act and the authority
delegated to the Secretary of Interior thereby. 97 Yet the Court has also said that its equitable
apportionments are “neither dependent upon nor bound by existing legal rights to the resource
being apportioned” because “although existing legal entitlements are important factors in
formulating an equitable decree, such legal rights must give way in some circumstances to
broader equitable considerations.” 98 It has held that weighing these interests in reviewing federal
agency actions that have incidental allocative effects misconstrues the judicial role in such
contexts. 99 And it has at least once set aside a federal permit as contrary to these interests:

Understanding the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in Controversies Between the States, 18(1) J. App. Prac. &
Proc. 21, 39-40 (2017) (noting that the “resulting inquiry” is “very broad”). This includes the Court itself. See, e.g.,
Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982); South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854, 866 (2010);
Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502, 2515 (2018). Such factors’ relationship to still more generic notions like
“reasonable use” apparently remains fluid. See id. at 2315-15 (linking “reasonable use” as an initial threshold to
“all relevant factors” as a final choice method) (emphasis in original).
94
See, e.g., Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1053 (2015) (observing that the Court’s “remedial authority gains
still greater force because the Compact, having received Congress’s blessing, counts as federal law”); Texas v. New
Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983).
95
When it finally reached the interests on the Colorado River, the Boulder Canyon Project Act and federal water
delivery contracts convinced the Court that the waters of the lower Colorado had already been fully allocated by
law. See Arizona v. California et al., 373 U.S. 546, 565 (1963) (“Where Congress has so exercised its constitutional
power over waters courts have no power to substitute their own notions of an “equitable apportionment” for the
apportionment chosen by Congress.”).
96
373 U.S. 546 (1963).
97
See Arizona, 373 U.S. 597 (calling equitable apportionment a “method of resolving disputes,” not a substitute for
laws stemming from duly exercised congressional powers). This was arguably implicit from Wheeling Bridge II. See
supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
98
Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon and Washington, 462 U.S. 1017, 1025 (1983).
99
See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 107 & n.12 (1992) (reversing Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 616 (10th
Cir. 1991)).

15

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3606721

Illinois’s Lake Michigan diversions. 100 It has fashioned—or allowed its special masters to
fashion—damage awards for downstream states injured by upstream breaches of interstate
compacts that make no mention of remedies for breach. 101 Indeed, it went so far in one recent
decision as to select the rule on interest accruing from a judgment that a majority thought fairest
to the parties. 102 The Court has, in short, demonstrated quite a tolerance for declaring what
appear to be constitutional (or perhaps sub-constitutional) norms protecting these interests. 103
Yet it may be the Court’s refusals of relief—and of access to this docket—that show the
rift at its widest. At least four times the Court has rejected claims as premature under Article III’s
case/controversy requirement, 104 seemingly in line with familiar standing doctrines. 105 It has also
denied relief where the United States was an immune but indispensable party that had not

See Wisconsin et al. v. Illinois et al., 278 U.S. 367, 416-21 (1929).
See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 130-34 (1987) (holding that damages may substitute for compact’s
remedy of repayment in water where latter would be inequitable); see also Kansas v. Nebraska and Colorado, 135
S. Ct. 1042, 1051-52 (2015).
102
See Kansas v. Colorado,533 U.S. 1, 14-16 (2001). Technically, the majority only seemed to agree on their
rejection of the dissenters’ preferred rule. See id. at 16 n.5.
103
Cf. Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 28 (1975) (Monaghan, Foreword) (noting that the Court’s use of prophylactic doctrinal rules and remedial
discretion in protecting civil liberties has been its resort to “subconstitutional” norms that must suffice unless and
until Congress responds with legislation).
104
See Arizona v. California et al., 283 U.S. 423, 464 (1931); New York v. Illinois et al., 274 U.S. 488, 489-90 (1927);
Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 674 (1931); New Jersey v. New York and Pennsylvania, 283 U.S. 336,
345-46 (1931); cf. United States v. Nevada and California, 412 U.S. 534, (1973) (denying the United States’ petition
for leave to file a complaint against the states of the Truckee River basin as premature); Nebraska v. Wyoming et
al., 325 U.S. 589, 657-62 (1945) (Roberts, Frankfurter, and Rutledge, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that Nebraska’s
withdrawals from the North Platte River were wasteful and that a true shortage did not exist).
105
Cf. Vermont Agency of Nat. Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774-78 (2000); Schlesinger
v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-23 (1974); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 437 (1939);
Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 73 (1927). It may be worth noting that standing doctrine’s historical
underpinnings have been challenged as forcefully as has its conceptual coherence. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article
III and the Cause of Action, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 777, 800-51 (2004); Fallon, supra note 17, at 1095-1104.
100
101
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consented to suit. 106 Although not free from doubt, 107 this too seems consistent with other, more
familiar doctrines and the Constitution’s text.108 Yet, in at least nine denials of leave to sue 109
and a dozen full-opinion denials of relief, 110 the Court has made its reluctance to judge and to

See Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558, 571-72 (1936); Texas v. New Mexico 352 U.S. 991, 991 (1957); cf. Florida
v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502, 2512 (2018) (noting Special Master’s recommendation that the case be dismissed for
lack of United States as indispensable party). Although it granted leave to file, the Court ultimately denied relief to
Idaho in its Columbia-Snake River salmonid case in good part because of how bound up with the United States’
dam operations the salmon run declines had been. See Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon and Washington, 462 U.S.
1017, 1025-29 (1983).
107
In United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892), the Court rejected the state’s argument that it could not be sued
over a boundary dispute involving the Red River, establishing that the United States could sue states in the Court’s
original jurisdiction. Id. at 646-47 (overruling Texas’ demurrer denying that it could be sued by United States as
parens patriae). Curiously, in granting the United States’ leave to bring compact claims against New Mexico in the
pending dispute over the Río Grande, Justice Gorsuch’s opinion suggested that leave was being granted at least in
part because the United States was “seeking substantially the same relief” as Texas and because Texas had not
objected to the leave. See Texas v. New Mexico, 138 S. Ct. 954, 960 (2018).
108
Article III differentiates “cases” surrounding legal topics of core national importance from “controversies”
where its jurisdiction is defined not by subject matter but by party alignments. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s
Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 447, 494-511 (1994).
Article III’s inclusion of “Controversies to which the United States shall be a party” was construed to allow the
Union to sue in its own courts but narrowed to exclude disputes in which the Union was the defendant. See, e.g.,
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 336
(1816).
109
See Arizona v. California et al., 292 U.S. 341, 360 (1934); Wisconsin v. Minnesota, 382 U.S. 935, 935 (1965); Ohio
v. Wyandotte Chems. Co. et al., 401 U.S. 493, 505 (1971); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee et al., 406 U.S. 91, 108
(1972); United States v. Nevada and California, 412 U.S. 534, 539-40 (1973); South Dakota v. Nebraska, 485 U.S.
902 (1986); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 488 U.S. 1000, 1000 (1989); South Dakota v. Nebraska, 485 U.S. 902, 902
(1986); Mississippi v. United States, 500 U.S. 929 (1991).
The denials of leave to sue foreground certain practical similarities between the original and appellate
dockets. See Arthur D. Hellman, The Business of the Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act of 1925: The Plenary
Docket in the 1970s, 91 Harv. 1711, 1764 (1978); Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections
Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1643, 1704-13 (2000) (describing the Court’s
discretionary control of its appellate jurisdiction since 1925). Quite simply, “[a] court that can simply refuse to hear
a case can no longer credibly say that it had to decide it.” Id. at 1717.
110
See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 117-18 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 526 (1906); New York v.
New Jersey et al., 256 U.S. 296, 314 (1921); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 288 (1923); Connecticut v.
Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 674 (1931); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 530 (1936); Texas v. New Mexico et
al., 352 U.S. 991, 991 (1957); Vermont v. New York et al., 417 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1974); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee
et al., 451 U.S. 304, 331-32 (1981); Idaho, 462 U.S. at 1029; Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 323-24 (1984);
Oklahoma and Texas v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 236-40 (1991). A series of motions for preliminary injunction
and leave to file surrounding the same controversy ended in nine separate denials in early 2010. See Wisconsin et
al. v. Illinois et al., 559 U.S. 1091 (2010); Michigan v. Illinois et al., 559 U.S. 1091 (2010); New York v. Illinois et al.,
559 U.S. 1091 (2010).
106
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enjoin states manifest. 111 And it has repeatedly justified such decisions in utilitarian terms: to
remedy was said to entail more harm than the help to be given. 112 Petitioning states, thus, may
actually have a footing before the Court like that of most other petitioners: contestants in a
lottery they are unlikely to win. 113 This is curious because the Court’s theory of states’ sovereign
dignity is at least nominally a rejection of utilitarian balancing. 114 The state is owed its sovereign
dignity regardless of who is harmed or helped. 115 Even putting aside the folklore that a denial of
relief is a denial of right, 116 thus, the states’ legal interests in shared waters are both increasingly
focal and increasingly opaque.

111
The Court’s notorious reluctance to grant relief has evidently spurred compact negotiations in several instances.
See G. Emlen Hall, High and Dry: The Texas-New Mexico Struggle for the Pecos 4-5 (2002); see generally Norris
Hundley, Jr., Dividing the Waters: A Century of Controversy Between the United States and Mexico (1966). Some
commentary has lately argued that the Court’s tendency has invariably prejudiced states’ interests. See Jonathan
Horne, On Not Resolving Interstate Disputes, 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & Lib. 95 (2011).
112
See, e.g., Kansas, 206 U.S. at 107-18; Connecticut, 282 U.S. at 672-74; Washington, 297 U.S. at 522-29;
Colorado, 320 U.S. at 393-94; Colorado, 467 U.S. at 319-23. Only in Colorado II did a dissent contest the Court’s
denial of relief. See 467 U.S. at 824 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113
See Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 324-26 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that complaining
State’s burden of proof and majority’s approach to special master’s report made it effectively impossible to gain
relief); see also H.W. Perry, Jr., Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme Court 216 (1991).
Perry even concluded that this rendered the original docket unworthy of separate consideration within a study of
the Court’s ‘deciding to decide.’ See Perry, supra, at 24-25 (observing that the original docket “need not detain
us”).
114
See Litman, supra note 20, at 1253-55 (describing the Court’s dignitarian theory of state sovereignty as
“expressive,” as entitling states to a certain kind of respect regardless of how they may have wronged citizens, and
as absolving states from burdens they might otherwise bear); cf. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S.
Ct. 1461, 1475 (2018) (“The [Court’s] anticommandeering doctrine may sound arcane, but it is simply the
expression of a fundamental structural decision incorporated into the Constitution . . . to withhold from Congress
the power to issue orders directly to the States.”).
115
Cf. Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 15, at 1852 (“Once the sovereign “state” is identified with the people,
sovereignty comes close to meaning democracy, and the difficulty comes in explaining how constitutional law
legitimately can place limits on the democratic exercise of popular will.”).
116
See, e.g., Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 83-84 (1960) (“Absence of remedy is absence of right. Defect of
remedy is defect of right. A right is as big, precisely, as what the courts will do.”); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The
Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 458 (1897) (“[A] legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man
does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court—and so of a
legal right.”).
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The Court’s docket has turned noticeably in the last three decades to adjudicating the
breach of interstate waters compacts. 117 As in other compact fields, 118 its dignitarian theory of
state sovereignty has featured here, too. 119 The Court recently reasoned that any bargain struck
for waters in a compact must be understood as having emerged “in the shadow of [the Court’s]
equitable apportionment power,” 120 confessing that it was “‘difficult to conceive’ that a
downstream State ‘would trade away its right’ to [an] equitable apportionment if, under such an
agreement, an upstream State could avoid its obligations.” 121 Yet it is hardly clear that the Court
can actually distinguish these aggregate interests in shared waters (or their accommodation) from
the adjudication of particularized private claims to the same resource(s). 122

See, e.g., Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124 (1987); Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1 (2001); Kansas v. Nebraska
and Colorado, 135 S. Ct. 1042 (2015); Montana v. Wyoming and North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016).
118
See, e.g., Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 351-53 (2010) (holding that interstate compacts do not imply
a duty of good faith or fair dealing and that a federal court may not order punitive relief against a state that
strategically withdraws from compact to the great detriment of other states).
119
See, e.g., Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 67-69 (2003) (reading 1785 compact and 1877 arbitral award
between Virginia and Maryland to reserve to Virginia the traditional incidents of sovereignty over Potomac River
because they were not expressly foreclosed).
120
Kansas v. Nebraska and Colorado, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1052 (2015). Citing Kansas v. Colorado, the Court announced
that it “ha[d] recognized for more than a century its inherent authority, as part of the Constitution’s grant of
original jurisdiction, to equitably apportion interstate streams between States.” Id.
121
Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1052 (quoting Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 134 (1987), as a basis for awarding
damages). This was remarkable because one of the very few interstate compacts done in the shadow of the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction was done after the Court had twice denied any relief to the downstream
state. See David W. Robbins & Dennis M. Montgomery, The Arkansas River Compact, 5 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 58,
92 (2001).
122
As just one example, in a dispute over their Yellowstone River Compact, Montana and Wyoming differed in their
interpretation of the compact’s controls on changes of use—specifically, the upstream state’s users’ wholesale
change from flood- to drip-irrigation technology. See Montana v. Wyoming and North Dakota, 563 U.S. 368, 375-78
(2011). In resolving that this kind of technological change, because it was not expressly forbidden by the compact,
was at least not per se violative of the downstream state’s rights, the Court reasoned that the absence of individual
litigation over such changes of use by private appropriators in either of the states “strongly implie[d]” that
wholesale technological changes of the kind did not deny the downstream state’s rights under the “no injury rule”
and so was not within the compact’s prohibitions either. See id. at 379-81. Of course, the risk/reward balance of
individual claims brought in a no-injury state law regime bear no necessary relation to the analogous balance(s) of
aggregate state interests claimed before the Supreme Court. Deterrence of the former, thus, is hardly probative of
the latter.
117
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Finally, as the Court has repeatedly rejected utilitarian balancing of states’ sovereign
prerogatives, 123 these interests in interstate waters have grown increasingly opaque. The Court
allows that the Constitution itself presupposes a measure of judicial commandeering in its
requirements that state courts adjudicate federal claims and defenses. 124 But that speaks not at all
to a federal court—even the Supreme Court itself—ordering state authorities around by
decreeing that they rebalance the private entitlements to their waters. 125 That sort of equitable
relief may be “commandeering” in its purest form. Even in the epic litigation over Virginia’s
public debt as of its secession 126 the Court had pointed misgivings about ordering the West
Virginia legislature to pay its share. 127

See Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Business v. Sebelius, 56 U.S. 519, 580-81 (2012) (invalidating conditional federal funds for
Medicaid insurance coverage expansion as an overly coercive “gun to the head” of the states); Franchise Tax Bd. v.
Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 498-99 (2003) (refusing to balance state interests in the application of California and Nevada’s
competing statutory policies for full faith and credit purposes out of a perceived futility in doing so); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S 144, 175 (1992) (invalidating provision of Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy amendments
for having “crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion” of states).
124
See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907 (1997) (“It is understandable why courts should have been
viewed distinctively . . . unlike legislatures and executives, they applied the law of other sovereigns all the time.”);
Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476 (2018) (“[C]onspicuously absent from the list of powers given to Congress is
the power to issue direct orders to the governments of the States.”).
125
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) (“[W]here the Federal Government compels States to
regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished.”); Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (“The Federal
Government may neither issue directives requiring States to address particular problems, nor command the States’
officers . . . . It matters not whether policymaking is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or
benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual
sovereignty.”). Despite the roots in standing analysis, see Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 18, at 395 (“Allowing
states to sue as plaintiffs to vindicate their general interest in protecting their citizens signaled that majoritarian
interests in exercising power were considered to be the rough equivalents of individualized, common-law claims of
right, at least insofar as standing was concerned.”), the Court’s remedial authority over states is surely an
exception to its declared understandings of the Tenth Amendment today. Cf. Alabama et al. v. North Carolina, 560
U.S. 330, 351-52 (2010) (distinguishing normal contract law from relief to be granted in compact dispute on the
grounds that the Court is powerless to “‘order relief inconsistent with [the] express terms’ of a compact, ‘no
matter what the equities of the circumstances might otherwise invite.’”) (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 523,
U.S. 767, 811 (1998)).
126
See Orth, supra note 5, at 90-109; Anne Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled
Remedies, 107 Yale L.J. 77, 118-20 (1997) (Woolhandler, Remedies).
127
See Virginia v. West Virginia et al., 246 U.S. 585, 593-601 (1918); cf. Note, supra note 19, at 692 (calling this the
“hardest question” raised by the State-State original jurisdiction docket). Although the Court ultimately concluded
that Article III did vest it with such authority, see 246 U.S. at 600, it has rarely ordered states to do anything.
123
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The only evident way to square the Court’s disparate accounts of our judicial federalism
and waters is that the shared waters injuries actuating the Court’s remedial powers have been and
are constitutional at base. 128 One might, following Hohfeld, classify the many denials of relief as
the complaining state’s no-right. 129 But even this would make more out of the Court’s work than
it has usually allowed. The large majority of the denials have been without prejudice, 130 i.e., nonfinal. 131 Indeed, the Court has at least once expressly rejected an argument that a prior denial of
relief was a judgment in favor of the defending state. 132 And that was the very opinion by which
the Court granted what amounted to an anti-suit injunction to that state—the successful
defendant in the prior proceedings—against private claimants pressing downstream injuries in its

Given the Court’s precedents, the Tenth Amendment may ground these injuries in the Constitution. See David L.
Shapiro, Federalism: A Dialogue 114-15 (1995) (discussing New York and FERC v. Mississippi); cf. David E. Engdahl,
Construction of Interstate Compacts: A Questionable Federal Question, 51 Va. L. Rev. 987, 1030-38 (1965) (raising
but rejecting the prospect that a federal common law of interstate waters entails that state interests in the waters
must be constitutional for jurisdictional purposes). If so, it is of considerable consequence to the injuries’ legal
effect. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of the Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 55-56 (1985)
(Merrill, Powers) (contrasting “delegated” and “preemptive” lawmaking by federal courts and their legitimacy).
129
Hohfeld’s account of “jural opposites” and “correlatives” in judicial reasoning aligned one party’s “privilege” to
some other party’s (or parties’) “no-right” where a privilege to enter is “the negation of a duty to stay off.” Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning 37-39 (Walter Wheeler Cook
ed., 1919) (Greenwood Press 1978). Duty-negation is at least presumably adjudicable.
130
An explicit declaration that the denial of relief (or of leave) was without prejudice can be found in Missouri v.
Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 526 (1906), Kansas v. Colorado et al., 206 U.S. 46, 117 (1907), New York v. New Jersey et al.,
256 U.S. 296, 314 (1921), North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 388 (1923), New York v. Illinois et al., 274 U.S.
488, 490 (1927), Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 674 (1931), Arizona v. California et al., 283 U.S. 423,
464 (1931), Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 505 (1971), United States v. Nevada and California, 412
U.S. 534, 540 (1973), Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon and Washington, 462 U.S. 1017, 1029 (1983). Justice Cardozo’s
meticulous opinion in Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936), remains the only instance where the Court
conclusively denied relief in a decree affirming a special master to the effect that the complaining state could not
make a case. See id. at 530.
131
A dismissal without prejudice will generally not bar future litigation of the same claim(s) by the same claimant.
See Semtek, Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 505 (2001) (observing that an “‘adjudication upon
the merits’ is the opposite of a ‘dismissal without prejudice’”). The Court has dismissed certain waters complaints
with prejudice, however, as, for example, the dismissal owing to a settlement the parties reached in Kansas v.
Nebraska and Colorado, 538 U.S. 720, 720 (2003) (No. 126 Orig.).
132
See Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 391 (1943) (“Colorado urges that our decision in [Kansas] amounted to an
allocation of the flow of the Arkansas River between the two States. We cannot accept this view.”).
128
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courts and in the lower federal courts! 133 As Professor Sherk put it, “the Court established the
precedent that the initiation of litigation in lower courts . . . may meet the ‘injury or damage’
requirement.” 134 Shielding its own water users from repetitive litigation of their interests was
evidently enough stake for the State before the Court. Thus, although the Court has in general
guarded federal courts’ remedial discretion assiduously—even in the face of statutory
interventions 135—its apparent tendency to take jurisdiction over these injuries is matched to a
less predictable tendency to deny relief absent extraordinary circumstances. 136
One response may be that fairness to the states comes one case at a time—starting with
whether to take jurisdiction. 137 Yet if, as it declared in 1987, “[b]y ratifying the Constitution, the
States gave [the Court] complete judicial power to adjudicate disputes among them,” 138 then
decisions weighing “all the factors which create equities in favor of one State or the other” 139
which are explained in deliberately reasoned and officially reported opinions would be
misleading at best if they were not what the Court does elsewhere under Article III: set

See Colorado, 320 U.S. at 400. Colorado’s bill in the Court’s original jurisdiction detoured it around several
otherwise delicate questions of its remedy’s place in equity or law, arising under federal or state law, and available
jurisdictional bases in the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
134
George William Sherk, Dividing the Waters: The Resolution of Interstate Water Conflicts in the United States 8
(2000).
135
See Jared Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 Va. L. Rev 485 (2010); Daniel A. Farber,
Equitable Discretion, Legal Duties, and Environmental Injunctions, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 513 (1984); Zygmunt J.B.
Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 524 (1982).
136
See, e.g., Linsley, supra note 93, at 45-49; Lauren D. Bernadett, Equitable Apportionment in the Supreme Court:
An Overview of the Doctrine and the Factors Considered by the Supreme Court in Light of Florida v. Georgia, 29 J.
Envtl. L. & Litig. 511, 517-21 (2014). Interestingly, the Court has been especially open to modifying its decrees in
the interstate waters cases. See Mandilk, supra note 19, at 1901-02, 1919.
137
This much is manifest in the Court’s opinions on denying leave to file. See McKusick, supra note 19, at 197 (“In
practice, the Court’s exercise of discretion in determining the “appropriateness” of a state-party suit has entailed a
three-dimensional analysis, focusing on three factors: (i) the parties to the suit; (ii) the subject matter of the suit
and its “seriousness and dignity,” that is, its importance; and (iii) the existence or not of an alternative forum, for
the cause of action or for at least the controlling issue.”) (quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93
(1972)).
138
Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S.124, 128 (1987) (citing Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 720
(1838)).
139
Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 393-94 (1943) (emphasis added).
133
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precedent. 140 Equity is supposed to follow the law, of course, and even minimalistic decisions—
assuming they are precedents—should inform a proper fairness inquiry in later suits. 141 The
fairness answer, thus, begs the real question: may the Court shape a law of interstate waters
through its jurisprudence?
1. Original Jurisdiction Opinions as Sources of State Interests. At first pass, original
jurisdiction precedents’ binding force appears limited. 142 The original jurisdiction differs from
what we may call “revisory” jurisdiction. 143 For claims only the Court may adjudicate, the
institutional hierarchy charging high court opinions with their familiar force is missing: only the
Court itself need decide whether to follow its own precedent. 144 And where the Court has done

As the literature on precedent documents in depth, judicial decisions and their communication entail costs and
the more often the same decision must be made repeatedly the more excessive those costs. See Tara Leigh Grove,
The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 21-26 (2009) (Grove, Vertical); Cass R. Sunstein,
One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court 46-60 (1999); cf. Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39
Stan. L. Rev. 571, 572-75 (1987) (explaining forward-looking and backward-looking decision costs). Here, besides
mounting decision costs, the Court would be denying the equality of states if it refused to be bound by past
precedents in present controversies.
141
The fairness of deciding like cases alike is (and has long been) among the core justifications for following
precedent. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents? 46 Stan. L. Rev. 817,
849-56 (1994) (hereafter, Caminker, Precedents); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 145-46
(1996) (noting that factored decision-making is typically attentive to precedent because it is so often the core of
aspiring to fair treatment); Schauer, supra note 140, 595-97.
142
Not only is the original jurisdiction a tiny fraction of the Court’s caseload. For those disputes falling within the
Court’s exclusive original jurisdiction, only the Court’s members and its special masters may be bound. Cf.
Caminker, Precedents, supra note 141, at 824 (“The duty to obey hierarchical precedent tracks the path of review
followed by a particular case as it moves up the . . . judicial tiers.”); Schauer, supra note 141, at 599 (“When a
precedent has no decisional significance as a precedent, the conscientious decisionmaker must look at each case in
its own fullness.”).
143
Caminker, Precedents, supra note 141, at 824 (“[A] court can ignore precedents established by other courts so
long as they lack revisory jurisdiction over it.”). Official reporters played a key role in the formation of our judicial
hierarchies. And the Supreme Court’s opinions grew more focal as its capacity as a court of error waned. See
Grove, Vertical, supra note 140, at 47-50. What remains considerably less clear is the place of a Supreme Court
opinion in subsequent Supreme Court original jurisdiction proceedings. Cf. id. at 45-56 (describing trend toward a
“vertically maximal” approach to opinion writing on the Supreme Court throughout the Twentieth century and the
Court’s focus on law declaration over error correction); Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from
Below, 104 Geo. L. Rev. 921, 945-46 & n.114 (2016) (collecting sources and noting that the Supreme Court exists
today largely to create uniform national precedents binding inferior courts).
144
Compare Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1499 (2019) (noting that “stare decisis is ‘not an inexorable
command’” and noting that the Court itself will employ a multi-factored approach to decide whether to overrule
140
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so in boundary disputes over time, 145 its equitable apportionments have shown an unsettling
tendency toward highly specific decisions 146—as well as a tolerance for letting conflicts linger
unresolved for years or decades. 147
For its part, the Court has signaled repeatedly and clearly that it regards its interstate
waters original jurisdiction controversies as precedents for similar future cases. 148 Yet it has just
as emphatically declared that everything in such a controversy turns on how the Court balances
the equities 149—seemingly reserving any ultimate judgment(s) as completely unfettered. 150 So
are these signals to inferior courts that they regard the opinions as precedent (to whatever extent

its own precedent interpreting the Constitution), with Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48
(1816) (holding that the Court’s revisory jurisdiction over state courts as provided by Section 25 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789 is necessary to protect both private rights and public interests that would be jeopardized by the excessive
conflict among jurisdictions if a single final adjudicator did not exist).
145
For example, the Court’s consistent adherence to the ‘rule of thalweg,’ or the use of the middle of a flowing
channel of a navigable water as the location of any interstate boundary, has hardened that principle as “interstate
common law.” See Louisiana v. Mississippi, 516 U.S. 22, 24-25 (1995) (reviewing four prior disputes between
Louisiana and Mississippi over the location of the state boundary in the Mississippi River and the Court’s constant
application of the rule) (citing Arkansas v. Tennessee, 397 U.S. 88 (1970); Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U.S. 479 (1890);
Missouri v. Kentucky, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 395 (1871)); see also Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158, 177 (1918).
146
See Mandilk, supra note 19, at 1899-1902; Linsley, supra note 93, at 39-40; Rhett B. Larson, Inter-State Water
Law in the United States of America: What Lessons for International Water Law?, 2(3) Int’l Water L. 1, 19-20
(2017); Bernadett, supra note 136, at 534. This much was evident early on. See W.J. Wehrli, Decrees in Interstate
Water Suits, 1 Wyo. L.J. 13, 21 (1946).
147
The Court has at least twice admonished states to settle their dispute given its perception of the low stakes and
mounting dispute costs. See, e.g., Montana v. Wyoming and North Dakota, 135 S. Ct. 1479, 1479 (2015) (“Parties
are . . . directed to consider carefully whether it is appropriate for them to continue invoking the jurisdiction of this
Court.”); Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 576 (1983) (“[I]t is difficult to believe that the bona fide differences in
the two States’ views of how much water Texas is entitled to receive justify the expense and time necessary to
obtain a judicial resolution to this controversy.”). In a third case it observed that litigation in general was unlikely
to resolve the sewage disposal crisis then afflicting major urban centers. See New York v. New Jersey et al., 256
U.S. 296, 313 (1921).
148
See, e.g., Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502, 2513 (2018) (“Our prior cases clearly establish that equitable
apportionment will only protect those rights to water that are ‘reasonably required and applied.’”) (quoting
Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 184 (1982)); Colorado, 459 U.S. at 182 (concluding that the “criteria relied
upon by the Special Master comport with the doctrine of equitable apportionment as it has evolved in our prior
cases”).
149
See, e.g., Florida, 138 S. Ct. at 2513 (quoting United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 505 (1945));
Colorado, 459 U.S. at 184).
150
See, e.g., Colorado v. Kansas et al., 320 U.S. 383, 391-94 (1943); Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 325-39
(1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (challenging majority’s analysis of Special Master’s proceedings and arguing that it
was without precedent and without deference to the master’s findings and conclusions).
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they may)—or merely to the Court’s own (future) proceedings? 151 The Court almost surely
possesses the practical authority for either directive. 152
The consequences loom large. How should states decide whether to bear the substantial
cost and considerable risk of an original action if not by comparing their claims to the relevant
precedents? 153 Fairness to states would seem to demand that the past holdings serve as binding
precedent. 154 Equal dignity means, if anything, that that which is protected to one state is owed
to all reciprocally. 155 Indeed, how could a dignified state decide whether to “give up” its socalled “rights” 156 in whatever bargain it might strike with its peer(s) and/or Congress by

In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, quoting the Nebraska factors in a case about pollution, it stated that “[t]he
question of apportionment of interstate waters is a question of “federal common law” upon which state statutes
or decisions are not conclusive.” See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105-06 (1972).
152
The Court’s place in our judicial hierarchies, though not free from doubt, is probably at least “‘supreme’ in
defining the content of federal law.” Grove, Vertical, supra note 140, at 40; see also id. at 31-40; Caminker,
Precedents, supra note 141, at 818 (noting that “longstanding doctrine dictates” that a court is bound to follow a
precedent established by a court “superior” to it); Adam Steinman, To Say What the Law Is: Rules, Results, and the
Dangers of Inferential Stare Decisis, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1737, 1739-43 (2013). It is worth noting that inferior courts’
handling of high court precedents often results in important “narrowing” and sharpening thereof, often to the
advantage of all concerned. See Re, supra note 143, at 951-71.
153
See Caminker, Precedents, supra note 141, at 850 (noting that obedience to higher court precedents facilitates
uniformity, predictability, and accuracy because of the proficiency in deciding issues of law that comes from being
an appellate court); but cf. Horne, supra note 111, at 104-16 (describing the Court’s “general aimlessness” in its
original jurisdiction cases and the conflicting signals sent to would-be litigants).
154
See Pushaw, supra note 108, at 475 & n.143 (noting that, among the hallmarks of “cases” in the Founders’
understanding, the concept of stare decisis, “decided cases as binding authority on lower courts,” had emerged in
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries). The original jurisdiction grants in Article III arguably bolster this
reasoning. Cf. California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 65-66 (1979) (“The Framers seem to have been concerned with
matching the dignity of the parties to the status of the court . . . .”); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 643
(1892) (“Such exclusive jurisdiction [as was made exclusive by the Judiciary Act of 1789] was given to this court,
because it best comported with the dignity of a State, that a case in which it was a party should be determined in
the highest, rather than in a subordinate judicial tribunal of the nation.”). This “dignified tribunal” theory of the
original jurisdiction grants, however, has been problematic when that jurisdiction is concurrent or when a federal
question is present. See Pfander, Rethinking, supra note 18.
155
Cf. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 544 (2013) (observing that “[n]ot only do States retain sovereignty
under the Constitution, there is also a ‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty’ among the States”); Henry Paul
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 723, 733-34 (1988) (hereafter
Monaghan, Stare Decisis) (observing that stare decisis accounts for much of why our present-day Constitution
differs so considerably from an original understanding of our federalism or separation of powers).
156
See Kansas v. Nebraska and Colorado, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1052 (2015).
151

25

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3606721

interstate compact except by measuring the Court’s extant decisions? 157 As Congress and
compacts govern more of the disputes arising from interstate waters, a plurality of forums must
confront these questions. Part II refocuses there.

II. REVISORY JURISDICTION AND JUDICIAL HIERARCHY: INTERESTS OVER REMEDIABLE INJURIES
Some of the interstate waters jurisprudence has arisen from the Court’s “revisory” or
non-original dockets. 158 These cases subtly highlight the importance of the forum within our
judicial systems and the contours of the Court’s (evolving) appellate jurisdictions. 159 “In [our]
pyramidal judiciary, precedent’s primary role is vertical.” 160 Yet, over time, this verticality has
shifted for our Supreme Court and interstate waters. State sovereign claims to waters began from
the federal judge-made law of equal sovereignty. 161 And any such interest protected to one state

On some of the first compacts and the interplay between their negotiation and the Court’s jurisprudence, see
Daniel Tyler, Silver Fox of the Rockies: Delphus E. Carpenter and Western Water Compacts (2003).
158
Landmarks include Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
299 (1851), The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851), Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1866),
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870), United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899),
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908), Bean v. Morris, 221 U.S. 485 (1911), United States v.
Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913), Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405
(1925), Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941), Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S.
91 (1972), Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982), and Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91
(1992). A long history of Congress’s changing the Court’s “appellate” (or “revisory”) jurisdiction thwart straight-line
comparisons.
159
Article III may oblige “inferior” federal courts to follow Supreme Court precedents, but its silence as to state
cases and courts and the Supreme Court’s revisory jurisdiction therein has remained contentious. From Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), continuing through the sweeping changes to the judicial code
during Reconstruction, see Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875), more such changes in the
Twentieth century, see Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037-44 (1983), to the contemporary differentiations of
state from federal law, the Court’s own crooked path to its current account of its revisory jurisdiction records a
varied sense of the significance of its own precedents. See Kevin M. Clermont, Degrees of Deference: Applying vs.
Adopting Another Sovereign’s Law, 103 Cornell L. Rev. 243 (2018); Matasar & Bruch, supra note 85, at 1382-89; cf.
Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of “Federal Law”: Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State
Rules for Decision, 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 797, 798-810 (1957) (tracing the many questions surrounding the statefederal law boundary that emerged in the wake of Erie v. Tompkins and the Court’s shifting approaches thereto).
160
Re, supra note 143, at 971.
161
In Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842), the Court held that title to submerged lands in New
Jersey’s Raritan Bay were an incident of sovereignty that had passed to the State as successor to the Crown’s
prerogatives and not as private property retained by one of the Crown’s proprietors. Id. at 417-18. Martin arguably
157
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is owed to all equally. 162 Thus, as the judge-made doctrines evolved, so too did the states’ shared
waters interests. 163 For example, the Court struggled for more than a century with the law to be
applied where riparian rights to shared waters were being adjudicated. 164 It held repeatedly that
state law should ordinarily decide while also maintaining that, regardless of that default, federal
legislation, common law, or jurisdiction could affect the rules of decision. 165 But with the
systems of such rights varying so from state to state and Wheeling Bridge and other shared
waters opinions lingering about, a long stream of cases probed the many federal and state
interests—challenging the Court to become increasingly precise in its accounts thereof. 166

established this as federal constitutional common law—which then became an incident of sovereignty to which all
states were entitled under the Court’s equal footing doctrine. See Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (13 How.) 212,
223 (1845).
162
See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911) (“[T]he constitutional equality of the States is essential to the
harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the Republic was organized.”); Pollard’s Lessee, 44 U.S. at 223
(declaring that admission to the Union “on an equal footing with the original states” entails the State’s having
“succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain” claimed by original states).
163
In Pollard, the Court’s equal footing doctrine—and the law of nations—was said to require that the ownership
of submerged lands in navigable waters be reserved to the State. See id. at 221-24. The bed and banks of
Alabama’s Mobile River, the product of three interstate tributaries intersecting to form the river and Mobile Bay
and flowing shortly into the Gulf of Mexico, were the subject of a title dispute tracing to a federal grant. The
Court’s majority held up Alabama’s place in the Union equal to that of the original states to decide that the federal
grant could not have reserved any sovereign prerogative to the United States for those prerogatives were merely
being held in trust for the State. See id. at 221. Pollard’s equal footing holding would become a bedrock principle of
law in both the Supreme Court and inferior courts. See, e.g., ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, (1989); Coyle,
221 U.S. at 567; Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 245 (1900).
164
See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 15-46 (1894) (reviewing cases); Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand
and Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 372-82 (1977) (reviewing cases and overruling Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S.
313 (1973)).
165
See United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1926); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 380-402 (1891);
see also Packer v. Byrd, 137 U.S. 661, 669-70 (1891); Railway Co. v. Renwick, 102 U.S. 180, 183 (1880); Jennison v.
Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 461 (1879); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 336-38 (1876).
166
In an interstate dispute decided after Wheeling Bridge I but before Wheeling Bridge II, Rundle v. Delaware and
Raritan Canal Co., 55 U.S. 80 (1853), the Court held that the parties—riparians on opposite banks of the Delaware
River dividing Pennsylvania and New Jersey—were holders of what it called revocable licenses to the river’s flow.
Id. at 94. The Court, through Justice Grier for a 5-4 majority, upheld the lower court’s dismissal on the grounds that
New Jersey law specifically authorized the dam and diversion at issue and Pennsylvania law, were the diversion on
its side, would have immunized the defendant from liability. See id. at 90-94. That overall approach appeared in
several subsequent cases. See Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 640-43 (1879); St. Louis v. Myers, 113 U.S. 566,
567-68 (1885). Even as the Court’s jurisdictional grounds shifted to the due process claims from a state’s having
allegedly ‘deprived’ riparian property, the Court first applied state law defining the riparian interest(s) as either in
being or not in being. See, e.g., Kaukauna Water-Power Co. v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 142 U.S. 254, 269-72
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The core example is interstate export. Although it once held that states could forbid the
export of their waters 167 due in large part to the public interest in water supply, 168 the Court was
eventually persuaded to narrow that holding considerably. 169 State laws can obviously be a
significant influence in the scarcity or abundance of local water resources, leaving simple
‘dormant’ commerce clause analyses ill-fitting. 170 Balancing state autonomy with obligations to
the Union, in short, demands considerable finesse. 171 If it is not legislative, it will be judicial and
that implicates the availability and choice of forum(s). 172 Although few of the Court’s revisory
jurisdiction holdings have turned upon waters’ being interstate, many have turned on waters’
being wholly intra-state. 173 The negative implication parallels the equitable apportionment

(1891); St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Comm’n, 168 U.S. 349, 358-71 (1897) (reviewing
cases); Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co. v. Patten Paper Co., 172 U.S. 58, 68-82 (1898); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S.
141, 152-65 (1900).
167
See Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356-58 (1908).
168
See Hudson County, 209 U.S. at 356 (“[F]ew public interests are more obvious, indisputable, and independent of
particular theory than the interest of the public of a state to maintain the rivers that are wholly within it
substantially undiminished, except by such drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit for
the purpose of turning them to a more perfect use.”).
169
See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 945-54 (1982); see also Weiland v. Pioneer Irr. Co., 259
U.S. 498, 502-03 (1922).
170
See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 956-57; Tarrant Regional Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 569 U.S. 614, 632 & n.11 (2013).
171
See Larson, supra note 146, at 44-50.
172
The admiralty jurisdiction and the lawmaking powers taken to inhere therein remain exemplary. The Court
expanded the admiralty jurisdiction’s territorial reach throughout the Nineteenth century—often in view of
interstate waters’ many shared advantages. See, e.g., The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 564 (1870); The
Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 457-58 (1852). That expansion then implied more lawmaking
authority—for the Court as well as for Congress. Consider Atlee v. Packet Co., 88 U.S. 389 (1875). It began as an
admiralty libel in the lower federal courts concerning a pier piling built in the main channel of the Mississippi with
which the libellant’s barge collided. Reversing the judgment, the Court cut a damages award by half on the
grounds that the pilot’s ignorance of the pier’s location was contributory negligence given the common standards
of care that Mississippi River pilots were held to maintain. See id. at 396-98. Similarly, in the famous Chelentis and
Jensen cases the Court held that state law rights—including those conferred by state statute—yielded to federal
maritime law and procedure as construed by the Court. See So. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); Chelentis v.
Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918).
173
The Black-Bird Creek case, distinguished in Wheeling Bridge I as involving the obstruction of a minor, wholly
intra-state tributary of the Delaware River, affirmed a judgment from the Delaware high court that state law
controlled the parties’ rights exclusively. See Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 250-52
(1829). Similarly, in Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568 (1853), the Court held that the very same federal
coasting license that immunized vessels from state-granted monopolies in Gibbons v. Ogden did not do so on rivers
like the Penobscot that were wholly intra-state and had non-navigable reaches separated from the coasts. See id.
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docket: interstate waters are unique jurisdictionally, equitably, and perhaps legally. Section A
explains the horizontal dimensions of this implication and Section B the vertical.

A. From Dignified Tribunal to Pyramid Peak
No better exemplar of forum-independence exists than the generations-long struggle over
Lake Michigan’s diversion into what is now known as the Chicago Area Waterway System
(CAWS). 174 This engineered reversal of several small streams originally flowing into Lake
Michigan began as an effort to flush Chicago’s sewage down the Illinois and Mississippi
Rivers. 175 In holding that the United States could seek and be awarded an injunction capping
Chicago’s diversions into the Illinois/Mississippi watershed, the Court first affirmed a district
court’s recognition of the Nation’s (non-statutory) cause of action arising under its treaty
responsibilities to Canada and the Commerce Clause. 176 Indeed, it believed the Nation’s interests
in the lakes might well be superior to those of the adjacent states. 177

at 575. Finally, shortly after Wheeling Bridge, in a diversity action against the city in Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S.
713 (1866), bridges obstructing navigation on a Pennsylvania tributary of the Delaware were held to be immunized
from liability by state law. See id. at 732 (Schuylkill River, Pennsylvania). Gilman’s choice of law was enforced
uniformly thereafter. See Sands v. Manistee River Improvement Co., 123 U.S. 288, 293 (1887) (Manistee River,
Michigan); Hamilton v. Vicksburg, Shreveport & Texas R. Co., 119 U.S. 280, 282 (1886) (Bouff River, Louisiana);
Cardwell v. Amer. Bridge Co., 113 U.S. 205, 205 (1885) (American River, California); Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107
U.S. 678, 679 (1883) (Chicago River, Illinois); Pound v. Turck, 95 U.S. 459, 462 (1878) (Chippewa River, Wisconsin);
cf. The Passaic Bridges, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 782, 792 (1865) (Passaic River, New Jersey).
174
The public nuisance action pursued by Michigan and others against the Corps of Engineers’ operation of that
system is reviewed in Michigan et al. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 758 F.3d 892, 894-99 (7th Cir. 2014).
175
The project’s first stage spurred the litigation in Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 248 (1901), which became the
Court’s first denial of relief in a state’s nuisance action against another state, see Missouri v. Illinois et al., 200 U.S.
496, 526 (1906)—after the Court had first published an exhaustive analysis confirming its exclusive jurisdiction to
hear the dispute. See Missouri, 180 U.S. at 220-41.
176
See Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 425-26 (1925). That decree was only entered after
years of dilatory delays by the district judge, Kenesaw Mountain Landis, ended with his leaving the bench to helm
major league baseball. See Herbert H. Naujoks, The Chicago Water Diversion Controversy, 30 Marq. L. Rev. 149,
158 (1946).
177
See Sanitary Dist., 266 U.S. at 425-26. This part of Holmes’ opinion answered the defendant’s argument that the
City of Chicago’s health and welfare were dependent upon the diversion which had been authorized by Illinois law.
See id. at 426 (“As to the ultimate interest in the Lakes the reasons seem to be stronger than those that have
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Later litigation of the states’ interests in the lakes and in the CAWS confirmed, however,
that the states’ quasi-sovereign interests could be adjudicated outside the Supreme Court. 178
Those courts were undeterred by the Supreme Court’s having supervised the CAWS diversion
and its abatement for decades. 179 Thus, although the Court’s equitable power to apportion shared
waters’ benefits as between states may be exclusive to the Court by statute, 180 that jurisdiction
was quite separate from the real interests that other courts might adjudicate with proper
jurisdiction. 181

established a similar standing for a state, as the interests of the nation are more important than those of any
state.”). The scope and relative priority of the Union’s interests in shared waters have reappeared periodically in
the Court’s opinions. See Int’l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399, 406-07 (1931); State of Oklahoma ex rel.
Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 521-28 (1941); United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499,
509-11 (1945); First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 328 U.S. 152, 170-75 (1946); United States v.
Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1956); United States v. R.B. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 122-24 (1967).
178
See, e.g., Michigan et al. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 770-71 (7th Cir. 2011); see also South
Dakota v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014, 1021-27 (8th Cir. 2003) (Missouri River); Georgia v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
302 F.3d 1242, 1252 & n.8 (11th Cir. 2002) (Flint River).
179
Only two terms after Sanitary District the Court heard the complaint of Wisconsin, Minnesota, Michigan, Ohio,
Pennsylvania and New York against Illinois and the Sanitary District. See Wisconsin et al. v. Illinois et al., 278 U.S.
367 (1929). Special Master Charles Evans Hughes had recommended that the Secretary of War’s permit to the
Sanitary District capping its diversion be enforced as issued—even as the District ignored its mass limits. See
Naujoks, supra note 176, at 164-65. In an opinion that delicately set aside the permit as insufficient to protecting
the complaining states, the Court noted that immediately enjoining the diversion would drown the city in its own
sewage but that the Great Lakes States’ interests in the lake levels nevertheless required action. See Wisconsin,
278 U.S. at 416-18. The next term saw the Court enjoin the diversion, see Wisconsin et al. v. Illinois et al., 281 U.S.
179, 201-02 (1930), a decree that would become one of its longest-lived “open” decrees demanding continuous
attention, frequent adjustment, and abundant interstate tensions. See Mandilk, supra note 19, at 1901 (calling
Wisconsin a “case with intriguing decree modifications that bear no resemblance to res judicata”). Congress
eventually legislated the Corps of Engineers’ authority over the CAWS system. See Energy and Water Development
Appropriation Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-88, § 107, 95 Stat. 1137 (1981).
180
In California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59 (1979), the Court once declared in dicta that, although State party
jurisdiction was “conferred not by the Congress but by the Constitution itself,” id. at 65, its exclusivity with the
Court was not similarly constitutional in origin and, thus, although the Congress might be free to vest concurrent
jurisdiction elsewhere, it was not necessarily free to deprive the Court of jurisdiction over suits between a State
and the United States. See id. at 66 (“Congress has broad powers over the jurisdiction of the federal courts and
over the sovereign immunity of the United States, but it is extremely doubtful that they include the power to limit
in this manner the original jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by the Constitution.”).
181
This was the conclusion in the lower federal courts prior to Milwaukee II, as well. See, e.g., Illinois and Michigan
v. City of Milwaukee et al., 599 F.2d 151, (7th Cir. 1979), rev’d, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, 451 U.S.
304 (1981) (Milwaukee II); see also City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling Inc., 604 F.2d 1008, 1019-20 (7th
Cir. 1979); Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 240-42 (10th Cir. 1971).
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If Congress may elect to make the Court’s State-State jurisdiction exclusive, it may elect
not to do so, as 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b) confirms. 182 In Ohio v. Wyandotte Chem. Corp., 183 the Court
famously refused Ohio leave to file its interstate nuisance suit in the Court’s concurrent original
jurisdiction. 184 It did so in part because of the dispute’s complexity, 185 in deference to other
courts’ jurisdiction to apply “the same common law of nuisance upon which [its own]
determination would have to rest,” 186 and because the Court had evolved “to perform as an
appellate tribunal,” leaving it “ill-equipped” and “awkward” in “the role of factfinder without
actually presiding over the introduction of evidence.” 187 The State’s plea, in short, was
outweighed by other considerations.
The very next Term the Court held that states’ interstate nuisance claims against nonstate defendants should normally be filed in district court through the ‘arising under’ jurisdiction
there vested by § 1331. 188 This, it reasoned, followed from that statute’s use of the term

See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 271 (7th ed.
2016); Pfander, Rethinking, supra note 18, at 565 (“[F]or their part, the Justices have consistently upheld the
power of Congress to grant the lower federal courts concurrent jurisdiction over matters within the Court’s original
jurisdiction.”).
183
401 U.S. 493 (1971).
184
Under the current statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b), the “actions or proceedings by a State against the citizens of
another State or against aliens” was within the Court’s original but not exclusive jurisdiction. See 401 U.S. at 495.
185
Id. at 501-02 (quoting New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921)).
186
Wyandotte, 401 U.S. at 500. It was unclear from the context whether the Court expected this would be state or
federal common law nuisance.
187
Wyandotte, 401 U.S. at 498. Justice Harlan’s opinion was carefully tailored to the party-alignments there
presented: A State suing citizens of sibling- and foreign-states. Among the reasons for denying leave was the
growth of “long-arm” jurisdictional statutes to hail alleged tortfeasors into the forum state’s courts and the
enforceability in foreign state courts of any forum state judgment(s) obtained. See id. at 497-501.
188
See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee et al., 406 U.S. 91, 100-01 (1972) (Milwaukee I) (holding that federal common
law could be among the federal “laws” by which a claim arises for purposes of § 1331); cf. Wyandotte, 401 U.S. at
497-98 (“We have no claim to special competence in dealing with the numerous conflicts between States and
nonresident individuals that raise no serious issues of federal law.”). Without irony, the day it announced
Milwaukee I the Court granted Vermont leave to file suit against New York and a New York corporation for the
latter’s pollution of Lake Champlain. See Vermont v. New York et al., 406 U.S. 186, 186 (1972). Vermont had
argued that the corporation would be precluded from taking the action a Vermont court would order it to take
because the remediation itself would constitute a nuisance under New York law. See Vermont, 406 U.S. 186 (No.
50 Orig.) (Transcript of Oral Argument).
182
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“laws”—the “natural meaning” of which supposedly included federal common law. 189 It was not
the first to reach this conclusion. 190 But the Court also credited many of its original jurisdiction
landmarks mentioned above as “leading” cases in that domain. 191 The implication was clear. Not
only could sovereign interests be litigated in inferior courts, those courts could look to the
Supreme Court’s past equitable apportionment opinions to define and prioritize state interests. 192
Given the sweep of federal legislation on discharged water pollution, however, the Court
soon finished its arc by holding that the states’ federal common law claims had been “displaced”
by Congress. 193 It said nothing of any state interest in remedies Congress may have neglected. 194
Yet, despite this displacement, state law claims were said still to survive due in part to the

This interpretation followed, the Court reasoned, from a dissenting opinion in Romero v. Int’l Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959)! See id. at 377-80. (The Romero majority never reached that issue.) The fact
that a state had brought the case was also significant in Milwaukee. See 406 U.S. at 100-101 (observing that the
Court’s jurisdiction over the matter was not exclusive) (citing Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 470 (1884)).
190
See Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 99-100 (citing Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971); Murphy v. Colonial
Fed. Savings & Loan, 388 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1967); Mater v. Holley, 200 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1952)).
191
See Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 104-08 (citing Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325
U.S. 589 (1945); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921); New
Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906); Connecticut v.
Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1901)). The novelty in Milwaukee I was not
that federal common law might serve as the basis of a claim for relief in the ‘arising under’ jurisdiction. Cf. Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 680-84 (1946) (holding that jurisdiction was available for a claim of trespass against the FBI’s
alleged seizure of money in derogation of governing Fourth Amendment doctrine). The novelty lay in this
reference to the original jurisdiction controversies as the source of that federal common law and that such claims
could be pressed in district court.
192
See Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 105-08.
193
See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317-23.
194
Cf. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 316 (declaring that “the appropriate analysis in determining if federal statutory law
governs a question previously the subject of federal common law is not the same as that employed in deciding if
federal law pre-empts state law” and that “the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress”). Milwaukee II was indeed reinforced
that Term by a notably more general pledge of deference to Congress. See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials,
Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640-43 (1981). But this was hardly unprecedented for interstate waters. Following the Court’s
announcement that no federal common law checking the obstruction of navigable waters in Willamette Iron
Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 8 (1888), Congress wasted no time, enacting the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890.
Section 10 thereof prohibited any such obstruction without a federal permit (or Congressional permission). That
lateral transfer from the federal courts to Congress, and its delegation of permitting authority to the executive
branch, were upheld repeatedly in subsequent cases. See Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907);
Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 177, 192-95 (1910); United States v. Republic Steel, 362 U.S.
482, 492 (1960).
189
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legislation’s savings clauses—as long as it was the law of the state where the discharge
occurred 195 and assuming an appropriate venue. 196 In short, lower federal courts’ equity powers
to abate interstate injuries might well support jurisdiction—including for sovereign claimants—
where the law supplying the underlying entitlement was state law. 197
This intersection of jurisdiction and law is key to understanding the Court’s interstate
waters interests and their reconciliation with each other. Far from an indivisible, forum-bound
whole, they are bundles. Indeed, as several diversity suits over interstate waters illustrated before
equitable apportionment emerged, 198 states’ interests in shared waters include the fullest possible
scope and priority for their own laws. 199 The more precise questions for the Court and others,

See International Paper Co. v. Ouellete, 479 U.S. 481, 494-99 (1987); Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 329.
Cf. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 500 (“[T]he Act preempts laws, not courts. In the absence of statutory authority to the
contrary, the rule is settled that a district court sitting in diversity is competent to apply the law of a foreign
State.”); Wyandotte, 401 U.S. at 497-98 & n.3 (noting that the Court itself will not ordinarily adjudicate claims
predicated on local law). States are not “citizens” for purposes of the diversity jurisdiction statute, although state
claims arising under federal law do trigger the arising under jurisdiction. See Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155
U.S. 482 (1894); Stone v. So. Carolina, 117 U.S. 430 (1886); Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449 (1884).
197
Cf. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 502 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., concurring and dissenting in part) (noting that
majority’s holding means that the downstream, affected state’s common law is preempted by federal law, leaving
only the discharging state’s law for a federal district court in the downstream state to apply). It is a matter of some
debate whether, when Missouri and Kansas were decided at the turn of the Twentieth century federal courts’
equity jurisprudence was regarded as federal law for purposes of Articles III, IV or VI of the Constitution. Equity
may have been part of the “general law” so famously tapped in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842), and
skewered in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). See Collins, supra note 11, at 271-90; William A.
Fletcher, General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97
Harv. L. Rev. 1513, 1529-30 (1984).
198
See infra notes 345-58 and accompanying text.
199
Cf. Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of Forum Law, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 1237, 1241-66
(2011) (tracing a state’s interest in its law being applied in federal and sibling-state courts). This may have
considerable significance for states’ standing to sue. Cf. Grove, supra note 17, at 880-85 (arguing that state
standing to protect the operation of state law is the core of state standing to sue the United States); Davis, supra
note 17, at 2117-19 (noting the disparity between a state’s interest in pressing Tenth Amendment issues and a
criminal defendant’s and arguing that a state’s “public rights” under the Tenth Amendment which do not implicate
private rights may have to be shared with the Nation and/or other states).
195
196
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thus, is whether, as delineated in its holdings, any of these several interests can displace or
preempt inferior law and, if so, how that inferiority is determined. 200
Firstly, we should agree that the Court’s decrees were surely binding on even the
Congress as a function of Article III 201—supposing Congress did not change the operative law
before that decree’s execution. 202 Just as surely the executive branch was (and is) obliged to
enforce Article III court decrees to whatever extent they are final and valid. 203 Lastly, inferior
courts (state and federal) are bound to recognize final, valid Supreme Court judgments in any

The text and structure of our Supremacy Clause complicate the second question considerably, as already
suggested. It deems “Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance” of the Constitution “supreme
Law of the Land,” and commands “the Judges in every State” to be “bound thereby[,] any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const. art.VI. This second “judges clause,” thus,
distinguishes between law within and outside of court while the first clause permits—but hardly entails—that
federal common law does not preempt inconsistent state law. See Henry P. Monaghan, Supremacy Clause
Textualism, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 731, 767-68 (2010) (hereafter Monaghan, Textualism).
201
Cf. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-219 (1995) (holding that Article III vests power “not merely
to rule on cases, but to decide them”); United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165 (1984). Note, for example,
that the original decree in Wyoming v. Colorado was dissolved upon joint motion in 1957 because both states
wished to amend the bargain. See Wyoming v. Colorado, 353 U.S. 953, 953 (1957). By contrast, the decree in
Arizona v. California—being predicated largely, though not entirely, on the Boulder Canyon Project Act—
presumably would not be subject to such uninhibited bargaining by the states. See Arizona v. California et al., 373
U.S. 546, 565-66 (1963). Change of the statute, however, could annul that much of the decree. Finally, several
decrees have been a sustained draw on the Court’s equitable discretion—involving multiple adjustments,
amendments, and re-litigation. See Mandilk, supra note 19.
202
As the Court observed in Wheeling Bridge II, “[i]f, in the mean time [sic], since the decree, this right has been
modified by the competent authority, so that the bridge is no longer an unlawful obstruction, it is quite plain the
decree of the court cannot be enforced.” Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421, 431-32
(1856) (Wheeling Bridge II); see also The Clinton Bridge, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 454, 462-63 (1870) (discussing Wheeling
Bridge II’s holding that legislation had changed “the rule of decision for the court”); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S
(13 Wall.) 128, 146-48 (1872) (same). Differentiating changes of law from interference with the execution of a
decree has remained a delicate inquiry. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 226-27 (“When a new law makes clear that it is
retroactive, an appellate court must apply that law in reviewing judgments still on appeal that were rendered
before the law was enacted, and must alter the outcome accordingly.”); United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians,
448 U.S. 371, 406-08 (1980) (same).
203
Among the first separation of powers pillars brought to the Court was the finality of an Article III court’s
judgment as against the Executive’s discretion. See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410-11 (1792). But
judgment-finality has remained tied tightly to jurisdiction which, in turn, delimits executive authority. See Plaut,
514 U.S. at 224-25; cf. Baude, supra note 258, at 1862 (“[S]o far as the Constitution is concerned, pedantic
questions of jurisdiction mark the boundaries of the judicial and executive powers.”).
200
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subsequent proceedings. 204 And yet none of this engages with the canon of opinions in the
United States Reports construing the law of interstate waters and what it means to these actorinstitutions individually. What of the holdings those reports record? 205
1. Holdings on State Interests as “Law”? The Court’s dignitarian conception of state
sovereignty, backed by its own sense of plenary authority over the Constitution’s meaning, has
lately become a formidable sword. 206 This by itself is good reason to think that the Court’s
original jurisdiction holdings have forum-independent force. Indeed, it stands to reason that if the
interests there adjudicated stem from the states’ constitutional dignity, a ratio decidendi in past
precedent 207 protecting a State-as-State binds inferior courts confronting any same or similar

Cf. Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499 (1903) (holding that a federal judgment determining federal rights
has preclusive effect in later proceedings whether in state or federal court, despite no constitutional or statutory
provision to that effect); Restatement (2d) Judgments § 87 (1982) (“Federal law determines the effects under the
rules of res judicata of a judgment of a federal court.”); see also Wheeling Bridge II, 59 U.S. at 431 (declaring that
“if the remedy in this case been an action at law, and a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff for damages,
the right to these would have passed beyond the reach of the power of congress”); Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 50 U.S. (9
How.) 471, 478 (1850) (holding that judgment of title in Pollard v. Hagan was final and could not be reversed by
Congress). There are still significant doubts about the cross-jurisdictional scope of judgment recognition, however.
See infra notes 369-73 and accompanying text.
205
Any holding purporting to remedy a constitutional injury to a State, even assuming it binds inferior courts,
presents distinct questions to Congress and to the President. See Monaghan, Stare Decisis, supra note 155, at 73948. Wheeling Bridge I may have been the “most dramatic example” of such a holding and decree lacking any firm
underlying legal right, Collins, supra note 12, at 286, but it has hardly been the exception on interstate waters.
206
See, e.g., Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1474-79 (2018) (invalidating the Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act as contrary to states’ equal sovereignty); Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013)
(invalidating provision of Voting Rights Act of 1965 as infringement on states’ equal sovereignty); National Fed’n
Indep. Bus. v. Sebellius, 567 U.S. 519, 575-85 (2012) (invaliding Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s
penalization of non-participating states provisions as contrary to states’ sovereignty); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 925-35 (1997) (invalidating provision of Brady Act requiring local law enforcement officials to perform
background checks on potential gun buyers as contrary to anti-commandeering principle of New York v. United
States); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992) (invalidating provision of Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments Act forcing a state to choose between taking title to low-level radioactive waste or regulating
its disposal according to Congressional directive as “inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government”).
207
A ratio decidendi includes any rule of law expressly or impliedly treated by the judge(s) as a necessary step in
reaching a holding or in instructing a jury. See Monaghan, Stare Decisis, supra note 155, at 765 (quoting Rupert
Cross & J.W. Harris, Precedent in English Law 72 (4th ed. 1991)).
204
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issue(s). 208 Furthermore, these interests are arguably analogous to the preemptive federal
interests the Court has held survived Erie’s dismissal of federal general common law. 209 Such
interests have underwritten the judge-made law of federal reserved water rights, adjudicated in
both state and federal forums, 210 among other things. 211
By parity of reason, then, interference with such state interests could actuate their
protection in any court of competent jurisdiction—as has sometimes happened with boundary
disputes. 212 A plaintiff with standing, some right of action against a defendant subject to suit,
jurisdiction, and venue could present the question. 213 Some paths to court are clearly open to the

See Pushaw, supra note 108, at 476-84; Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1997, 2024-28
(1994); Monaghan, Stare Decisis, supra note 155, at 763-67. The Court several times declared, for example, that it
was bound by its equal footing doctrine to interpret the statutes admitting non-original states to the Union as
leaving to those states all of the prerogatives over shared and navigable waters that the original states enjoyed.
See, e.g., Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543, 546-47 (1886); Hamilton v. Vicksburg S. & P.R. Co., 119 U.S. 280, 284-85
(1886); Cardwell v. Amer. Bridge, 113 U.S. 205, 210-12 (1885).
209
Preemptive federal interests have emerged periodically since Erie. See, e.g., Semtek, Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed
Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 436-39 (1996); Boyle v.
United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 509-10 (1988); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 145 (1976); United
States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305, 308 (1947); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366
(1942). They have occasionally preempted “hostile” or “aberrant” state laws targeting sibling states and/or the
Union. See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S 580, 595-603 (1973).
210
See Jamison E. Colburn, Don’t Go In the Water: On Pathological Jurisdiction Splitting, 39 Stan. Envt’l. L.J. 3
(2019).
211
Cf. Alfred L. Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 Colum. L. Rev.
1024, 1030-68 (1967) (hereafter Hill, Preemption) (arguing that that the “enclaves” of federal common law after
Erie include interstate controversies, admiralty, the proprietary transactions of the United States, and international
relations).
212
Boundary controversies—many over shared waters—have often lay behind private title disputes. See, e.g., Kean
v. Calumet Canal & Imprv. Co., 190 U.S. 452 (1903); Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U.S. 406 (1891); Bowlby v. Shively, 30 P.
154 (Or. 1892), aff’d, Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Howard v. Ingersoll, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 381 (1851);
Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); Poole v. Fleeger, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 185 (1837). Indeed, the
Court once squarely held that its own precedent controlled a later, private iteration of one of its seminal cases,
Pollard. See Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 471, 478 (1850). Of course, judgment in a title dispute would not
necessarily bind the states as to their boundary dispute(s). See, e.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 116-17 (1963)
(Black, J., concurring).
213
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). This jurisdictional logic has worked in reverse,
too. Even apart from Wyandotte, a major factor in the Idaho v. Oregon and Washington salmon litigation was the
decrees that two lower federal courts had entered protecting Indian treaty rights in the Columbia and Snake river
basins. See Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon and Washington, 462 U.S. 1017, 1022-24 & n.6 (1983) (discussing United
States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974); Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969)).
208
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states themselves. 214 But what of others seeking to constrain rival—or to bolster their own—
demands on interstate waters?
As with its remedial choices protecting individual constitutional interests, 215 the Court’s
interstate waters opinions all weigh the remedying of specified injuries. 216 Injuries ordinarily
stem, of course, from interests. But these stem from a permanently open class of interests as
waters’ benefits and burdens evolve with society, culture, technology, climate, etc. They
distribute quite variably depending on the spatial and temporal scales of comparison. As quasisovereign interests, moreover, they are neither necessarily prior to nor coextensive with the
private interests behind them at any given time or place. 217 And yet an “action” involving them

Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 154 (1992) (noting that the state had filed the case under the
Declaratory Judgment Act challenging federal statute and that the states of Nevada and South Carolina had
intervened as defendants). State plaintiffs may not sue sibling states in any other forum than the Supreme Court,
see 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a), but this exclusion would not necessarily apply to non-state parties asserting state interests.
Cf. id. at 181 (“The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state
governments as abstract political entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials governing the States. . . . [It]
divides authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals.”).
215
See, e.g., Woolhandler, Remedies, supra note 126, at 99-111; Monaghan, Foreword, supra note 103, at 3-4;
Dellinger, supra note 12, at 1532-33 (discussing Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)); Hill, Remedies,
supra note 12, at 1112-18.
216
Legal remedies characteristically require some statutory right of action. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 (noting that,
although the Fourth Amendment “does not in so many words provide for its enforcement by an award of
monetary damages,” that it was “well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute
provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good
the wrong done”). Equitable remedies do not necessarily require a specific right of action, see Armstrong v.
Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 384 (2015) (“The ability to sue to enjoin unconstitutional actions by
state and federal officers is the creation of courts of equity, and reflects a long history of judicial review of illegal
executive action, tracing back to England.”), but they remain subject to all relevant statutory and constitutional
immunities. See id. at 1385.
217
See Hessick, supra note 17, at 1935-38 (arguing that only states have the duty to protect their public’s welfare
and that individual standing therefore necessarily differs from quasi-sovereign standing); Grove, supra note 17, at
864-68 (discussing Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), and arguing that the Court has long recognized state
standing to sue the United States in the lower federal courts seeking to protect the continued enforceability of
state law); cf. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992) (holding that a state may contest another state’s
legislation requiring in-state resource use over imports); Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1939)
(holding that a state’s claim to recover taxes from a debtor in another state may be adjudicated in district court
and that the Court would therefore deny leave to file in original jurisdiction); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262
U.S. 553, 591-92 (1923) (holding that one state’s statute providing for the withholding of natural gas from
consumers in neighboring states is a justiciable injury to the latter); Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1900)
214
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could proceed on the basis of a harm to some user/plaintiff(s), realized (or “imminent” 218) and
caused by a defendant(s). 219
From Wheeling Bridge and the Ohio’s navigability for large steamboats 220 to
Apalachicola Bay’s continued decline, 221 clear delineations of the collective interests in sharing a
resource like interstate waters have eluded the Court. This may be characteristic of quasisovereign interests generally. 222 But the uncertainty is growing deeper and more urgent with
interstate waters. Neither sovereign nor proprietary, quasi-sovereign interests were once declared
to be the “set of interests that the State has in the well-being of its populace.” 223 And, as the

(holding that a state’s arbitrary enforcement of its health and safety regulations is not a justiciable injury to
neighboring state).
218
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct.
1138, 1150 (2013).
219
Following the merger of law, equity, and admiralty, the federal rules provided for one “civil action,” F.R.Cv.P. 2,
dependent only upon a plaintiff with the requisite standing suing a culpable, non-immune defendant. See Spokeo
v. Robbins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550-54 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 182-88 (2000). Mandatory joinder of immune defendants under Rule 19(b) can obviously
be jurisdiction-defeating in shared waters cases as in others. See, e.g., Florida Wildlife Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 859 F.3d 1306, 1318 (11th Cir. 2017). But whether an immune defendant is “indispensable” to an action
turns on the potential for injury to the “interests of the absent sovereign.” Republic of the Philippines v. Pimentel,
553 U.S. 851, 867 (2008). And that, in turn, rests on the precise nature of the sovereign (or, presumably, quasisovereign) interests in shared waters that are or are not put at stake.
220
See supra notes 30-59 and accompanying text.
221
See Chris Berry & Amanda Concha-Holmes, Disaster in Apalachicola: Storms, the Oyster Industry, and
Development Decisions, in Disasters in Paradise: Natural Hazards, Social Vulnerability, and Development Decisions
79 (Amanda D. Concha-Holmes & Anthony Oliver-Smith eds., 2019).
222
Compare Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982) (noting that quasisovereign and parens patriae interests do “not involve the States stepping in to represent the interests of
particular citizens who, for whatever reason, cannot represent themselves”), with Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447, 484-86 (1923) (holding that citizens of Massachusetts, also being citizens of the United States, can
provide the state no interest as parens patriae by which to sue the United States).
223
Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602; id. at 602-07 (discussing Georgia v. Penn. R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945); Louisiana v. Texas,
176 U.S. 1 (1900); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923)).
Justice White’s opinion in Snapp differentiated sovereign interests such as “the demand for recognition from other
sovereigns” and “the exercise of sovereign power over individuals and entities within the relevant jurisdiction”
from quasi-sovereign interests. See id. at 601-02. And although Snapp also declared that quasi-sovereign interests
“must be sufficiently concrete to create an actual controversy between the State and defendant,” id. at 602, the
Court has repeatedly refused to qualify a State’s purely fiscal injuries as parens patriae interests of any kind. See
Georgia, 324 U.S. at 468 (Stone, C.J., Roberts, Frankfurter, Jackson, JJ., dissenting); Massachusetts v. Missouri et
al., 308 U.S. 1, 17-20 (1939); Pennsylvania, 262 U.S. at 591-98.

38

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3606721

Court has acknowledged, litigable interests of that kind depend directly on the forum in which
they are pressed. 224 So may any forum-independent law measuring, classifying, or organizing
these interests be synthesized? 225 Courts hearing challenges to the Army Corps of Engineers’
river management or to the Bureau of Reclamation’s storage operations could conceivably find
that one federal choice or another diminished or denied some state interest(s) in those waters. 226
If so, though, the Court’s own past reasoning about these interests—in opinions that can be
“sprawling,” “heavily footnoted,” 227 and yet still lacking in simple declarations of “law” 228—
becomes the focal point. Section B tightens the focus there.

B. An Equitable and Legal Enclave? Functions over Forums

See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 603 n.12.
The Snapp Court categorized the quasi-sovereign interest as inherently dependent upon case-by-case
development. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607. This may bind quasi-sovereign interests to the forum in which they are
pressed. See also Maryland et al. v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 735-45 (1981) (distinguishing between parens patriae
standing and standing derived from a “proper ‘controversy’” involving a “ground for judicial redress” or a “right
against the other State which is susceptible of judicial enforcement”). And it may mean that only forum-bound
rules may be derived from the Court’s shared waters precedents. See, e.g., Beaver, supra note 29, 65-72 (calling
the standard in Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 669 (1931), requiring a threatened invasion of rights
that is of serious magnitude and clearly proved the Court’s “adjectival” rule). If so, though, this holds considerable
implications for shared waters disputes and their adjudication. See infra notes 273-93 and accompanying text.
226
Two of the Court’s four pending controversies, Mississippi v. Tennessee and Florida v. Georgia, began as cases in
the lower federal courts where state interests were raised by states that had voluntarily submitted to suit or were
themselves the plaintiffs. See In re Tri-State Water Rights Litigation, 644 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2011); Hood ex rel.
Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 570 F.3d 625 (5th Cir. 2009). A third, in which the Court has repeatedly refused
leave to file in the original jurisdiction, involved invasive fish species’ reaching the Great Lakes by way of the CAWS.
Finally, litigation over states’ interests in the Missouri River, as impacted by the Corps’ flood control projects, has
periodically arisen. See South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014 (8th Cir. 2003); In re Operation of Missouri
River, 421 F.3d 618 (8th Cir. 2005).
227
See Monaghan, Stare Decisis, supra note 155, at 765 n.236 (insisting that the holding/dicta distinction is
“particularly necessary with respect to often sprawling, undisciplined, heavily footnoted opinions issued by the
Supreme Court”); Grove, Vertical, supra note 140, at 53 (noting that “as the Court focused increasingly on law
declaration, its opinions grew in length and in breadth”).
228
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
224
225
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Federal courts and water rights specialists alike begin from Justice Brandeis’s opinion in
Hinderlider v. La Plata. 229 For it was Hinderlider, decided the same day as Erie v. Tompkins 230
and written by the same author, that first characterized the equitable apportionment docket as a
discrete enclave of “federal common law.” 231 Yet that baptism came backing the Court’s theory
of statutory jurisdiction to hear Hinderlider’s petition. 232 Indeed, the precedential force of those
past judgments (or holdings) was not in question. Brandeis reasoned that the private claims upon
the interstate stream in the petition raised a jurisdictional federal question. 233 Indeed, ironically
enough, his reasoning was just as quickly abandoned when the Court held that where, as in

Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (stating that “whether the water
of an interstate stream must be apportioned between two States is a question of ‘federal common law’ upon
neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive”). Federal jurisdiction specialists often
invoke Hinderlider to this effect. See, e.g., Tobias Barrington Wolff, Choice of Law and Federal Jurisdictional Policy
in the Federal Courts, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1847, 1871-78 (2017); Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal
Common Law, 101 Va. L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (2015) (Nelson, Legitimacy); Charles Allan Wright & Mary Kay Kane, Law of
Federal Courts 817 (6th ed. 2002); Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1245, 1322-31 (1996); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 Harv. L.
Rev. 881, 908 (1986); Merrill, Powers, supra note 128, at 55-56; Monaghan, Foreword, supra note 103, at 14; Hill,
Preemption, supra note 211, at 1031-32, 1073-76. “When the Court pronounced that ‘[t]here is no federal general
common law,’ it set itself the task of determining which of its Swift-era precedents would survive that
pronouncement.” Wolff, supra, at 1852 (quoting Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)). And in Illinois v.
Milwaukee, where the Court characterized its original jurisdiction precedents as “leading” cases in the federal
common law of interstate waters, it took the same note of Brandeis’s opinion in Hinderlider. See Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 106 n.7 (1972).
230
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
231
See 304 U.S. at 110 (“[W]hether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between two States is a
question of “federal common law” upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be
conclusive.”). The Court itself has occasionally invoked Hinderlider for this point. See, e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico,
459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982) (“Equitable apportionment is the doctrine of federal common law that governs disputes
between states concerning their rights to use the water of an interstate stream.”).
232
See 304 U.S. at 101-03.
233
See Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 101-03. An earlier appeal in the case had to be dismissed for lack of this jurisdiction.
See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 291 U.S. 650 (1934). Later in his 1938 opinion, Brandeis
came to the application of the La Plata River Compact in the judgment below, acknowledging that it might by itself
supply the jurisdictional federal question. See 304 U.S. at 109-11 & n.12.
229
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Hinderlider, an interstate compact allocated shared waters, the compact’s construction was the
federal question. 234
The merits question raised in Hinderlider did not involve equitable apportionment at all
for the very good reason that neither state was party to the suit and no collective claims to the
water were asserted. 235 Indeed, Brandeis’s dictum that equitable apportionments are “binding
upon the citizens of each State and all water claimants” 236 was wholly unnecessary to his holding
that the state court was just as bound by the compact was as the State Engineer. 237 Lacking any
apportionment judgment at all, it was an aside. 238 This point was later lost in Hinderlider’s
wake. 239 But Hinderlider was undeniably a case involving only Colorado parties. Citing it as

Hinderlider was decided before the Court overruled People v. Central R. Co., 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 455 (1872), to
finally establish that the construction of an interstate compact presents a federal question for jurisdictional
purposes. See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438-39 & n.7 (1981) (discussing Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont
Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1852); Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm’n v. Colburn, 310 U.S. 419 (1940);
Petty v. Tenn.-Missouri Bridge Comm’n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959)). At least one commentator highlighted Hinderlider’s
key role in that jurisdictional watershed. See Engdahl, supra note 128, at 991-1003.
235
See Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 105-06. By reversing, the Court annulled the Colorado high court’s judgment for the
ditch company that the State could not “abrogate[]” by means of a compact any water rights decreed to it under
Colorado law. See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 70 P. 849, 850 (Colo. 1937). For its part,
the Colorado State Engineer had answered that “[a] state adjudication decree operates only on the state’s
equitable share of the flow” and that, therefore, “the ditch company had not been deprived of any vested right [by
its actions].” Brief of Appellants, Hinderlider v. The La Plata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Co., No. 437, at 14
(emphasis added).
236
304 U.S. at 106.
237
See Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 104 (rejecting the lower court’s assumption that “a judicial or quasi-judicial decision
of the controverted claims is essential to the validity of a compact adjusting them”). This was Hinderlider’s riddle:
the Supreme Court has always lacked (statutory) appellate jurisdiction to judge the content of state law contrary to
the state’s highest court. See Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210-11 (1935); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87
U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 635-38 (1875). For Hinderlider’s jurisdictional ruling to survive, thus, it must have been that
state interests in interstate waters “‘aris[e] under the Constitution’ within the meaning of the jurisdictional statute,
and, by implication, within the meaning of the supremacy clause” and of Article III because it is an “area of federal
preemption established not by Congress but by the Constitution.” Hill, Preemption, supra note 211, at 1076.
238
On the place of an “aside” in judicial opinions, see Dorf, supra note 208, at 2006. The effect of an
apportionment in a state court serving as a subsequent forum (F2) would depend on federal common law given
the F1 judgment’s origin and basis. See Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507-09 (2001). Of
course, federal common law was exactly what Hinderlider and Erie aimed to set right!
239
See supra note 229. In finally reversing the Colorado Supreme Court’s holding on the compact, see id. at 110-11,
Brandeis’s opinion for a unanimous Court urged the premise that an 1898 Colorado stream adjudication did not
and could not have adjudicated the rights of users in New Mexico. See id. at 103. From a sound premise, however,
234
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deciding the force of the Court’s equitable apportionment opinions, thus, raises more questions
than it answers. 240
Hinderlider’s picture of jurisdiction and law illustrates how interstate waters trap courts
in a choice-of-law dilemma with interlocking vertical and horizontal dimensions. 241 The basic
dilemma, whatever the forum, is the juxtaposition of state law that ought not to control a multisovereign dispute with federal law that remains inchoate or even nonexistent. 242 Decades of
experience with Erie have familiarized many with it, especially in equity. 243 But Brandeis’s
deliberate analysis in Hinderlider subtly illustrates the duality of any federal judge-made law’s
troubles with forum-determinative claims. As Justice Harlan observed concurring in Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper, Article III’s jurisdictional grant for controversies between states betrays no
intention—if there was one—of empowering the Court to make the law of shared natural

it then (illogically) inferred, likely from the State Engineer’s brief, that the compact could not have diminished any
“vested” water right of the company’s because all Colorado users’ claims combined could not be “greater than the
equitable share” owed to the state in the aggregate. Id. at 108. Here the Court either deemed the compact
allocations “equitable” per se or mistook other constitutional limits on the reach of judgments as the basis of its
premise. See infra note 369 and accompanying text.
240
But cf. Clark, supra note 229, at 1322 (citing Hinderlider and observing that “Article III’s grant of jurisdiction over
“Controversies between two or more States” has given rise to a significant enclave of ‘federal judge-made law.’”);
Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 507-09 (2006) (referencing Hinderlider’s
recognition of interstate apportionment as one of the “purest enclaves” of federal common law); Wright & Kane,
supra note 229, at 817 (same). Alfred Hill and Tobias Wolff each noted Hinderlider’s unique discovery of (statutory)
‘arising under’ jurisdiction that paradoxically did not arise under the federal common law cited. See Hill,
Preemption, supra note 211, at 1074-76; Wolff, supra note 229, at 1873.
241
See Colburn, supra note 210. On the basic Erie problems, see Wolff, supra note 229, at 1871-74; Clermont,
supra note 159, at 250-65. On Erie as a choice-of-law doctrine, see Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal
Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA and Shady Grove, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 3-15 (2012).
242
Compare Clark, supra note 229, at 1325 (“Because states are coequal sovereigns under the Constitution, neither
party to an interstate dispute has legislative power to prescribe rules of decision binding upon the other.”)
(footnotes omitted), with Field, supra note 229, at 899 (“[S]tate courts of general jurisdiction . . . can fill in any gap,
as long as no directive to the contrary exists. Federal judges by contrast (or state judges faced with a federal
common law problem) can fill in a gap only if some enactment permits them to do so; otherwise the area is not
one for federal rule at all, but is left to the states.”) (footnotes omitted). The option of making federal law in the
context of the case/controversy itself is available, see, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988),
but the Erie complications from doing so can be severe.
243
See Morley, supra note 12, at 233-36; Wolff, supra note 229, at 1873-78; Caleb Nelson, State and Federal
Models of the Interaction Between Statutes and Unwritten Law, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 657 (2013); Roosevelt, supra note
241, at 10-15; Field, supra note 229, at 885-87; Merrill, Powers, supra note 128, at 54-59.
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resources. 244 Any party-configuration jurisdiction, after all, could allow indefinite scope for such
law-making. 245 And that turns any federal judge-made law of state interests in shared waters
horizontally to face a Congress of ‘limited and enumerated’ powers to make federal “Laws.” 246
Now the solution for a shared waters legal (or equitable) enclave may well be that found
elsewhere: state law is disabled from defining or organizing quasi-sovereign interests—as are the
federal courts—unless and until Congress acts. 247 If so, though, it consigns a bundle of
overlapping interests in shared waters to a ‘brooding omnipresence’ rarely (if ever) to be sorted
out in the precincts of the Court’s original jurisdiction (with all the pitfalls already noted). 248

See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 239-40 (1907) (Harlan, J., concurring). This, of course,
anticipated part of Justice Brandeis’s reasoning in Erie. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938).
245
See Field, supra note 229, at 915-16; cf. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (“Congress has no power to declare substantive
rules of common law applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or “general” . . . [a]nd no clause in
the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.”).
246
See Merrill, Powers, supra note 128, at 19-24; Field, supra note 229, at 911-27; Clark, supra note 229, at 126471. The Supremacy Clause’s omission of federal common law from its menu of “Laws” that preempt inconsistent
state law is a federalism (vertical) issue, of course. See supra note 200. But the horizontal issue is also significant (if
not necessarily as significant as some would have it): “[t]he Constitution establishes intricate procedures for the
adoption of the various forms of positive federal law. Significantly, these procedures neither require nor permit
participation by the federal judiciary.” Clark, supra note 229, at 1269; see Monaghan, Textualism, supra note 200,
at 772 (“The Founders could not have conceived of an ability of the federal judiciary to impose a common law;
otherwise, why would the debates surrounding ratification have focused almost exclusively on the potential for
congressional overreaching, without mentioning the even more expansive law-declaring authority of the
judiciary?”).
247
See, e.g., O’Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. 79, 83-89 (1994) (acknowledging federal interests in the financial
transactions of federal agency but holding that if legal rights and duties are to be created supplementing
applicable state law, it is to be done by Congress); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305-08 (1947)
(holding that liability rule should be a matter of federal not state law but that it was incumbent upon Congress to
supply it); So. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[J]udges do and must legislate,
but they can do so only interstitially. . . .”); cf. Erie, 304 U.S. at 91-92 (Reed, J., concurring) (rejecting majority’s
suggestion that Swift v. Tyson was unconstitutional and arguing that Congress could prescribe all rules of decision
for federal courts sitting in diversity if it so chose). For an account reconciling this solution to the Court’s full canon
of opinions, see Merrill, Powers, supra note 128.
248
As Alfred Hill observed a half-century ago, even Holmes’ noted dissent in Jensen—where his rejection of Swift v.
Tyson took its hardest edge in the “brooding omnipresence in the sky” jibe—distinguished Article III’s admiralty
jurisdiction grant from general diversity jurisdiction. See Hill, Preemption, supra note 211, at 1033-34 & n.59
(quoting Jensen, 244 US. at 220-22). In the former, as with ‘controversies between two states,’ “state competence
is excluded by necessary implication from the constitutional grant of jurisdiction,” id. at 1031, whereas in the
latter, the same implication would repudiate much of the rest of the Constitution root and branch. See Roosevelt,
supra note 241, at 7-8.
244

43

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3606721

Overruling a demurrer to that effect in the very first Kansas v. Colorado,249 the Court famously
noted that its task was to “apply Federal law, state law, and international law, as the exigencies
of the particular case may demand.” 250 Yet, more than a century later, its opinions are still
alternatively cast as binding precedent 251 and as but a record of unfettered remedial discretion. 252
Looking ahead to a future where many more shared waters cases and controversies seem all but
assured, the federal courts’ two distinct yet not wholly separate functions should inform a
rethinking of this jurisprudence. Part III argues that we do best to keep these twin functions
separate in thinking about the law of interstate waters and the Court’s existing jurisprudence.

III. JURISDICTION TO REMEDY: RETHINKING INTERSTATE WATERS
For quasi-sovereign interests adjudicated in State-State original jurisdiction
controversies, understanding the Court’s opinions against the fullest backdrop of Article III
offers several insights. First, Article III frames a “judicial Power” serving two distinct—if not
entirely separate—functions: dispute resolution for its menu of party alignments 253 and the

185 U.S. 125 (1902).
185 U.S. at 147.
251
See, e.g., Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502, 2516 (2018) (reversing the Special Master for having “applied too
strict a standard” from past opinions); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 524 (1936) (concluding that
Washington had failed to prove its injury from Oregon’s diversions of the Walla Walla River by “clear and
convincing evidence” and quoting Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931), and New York v. New Jersey,
256 U.S. 296 (1921)).
252
See, e.g., Florida, 138 S. Ct. at 2513 (noting that the Court must take the case in an “untechnical spirit” because
it may be called upon to “adjust differences that cannot be dealt with by Congress or disposed of by the legislature
of either state alone”); Kansas v. Nebraska and Colorado, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1052 (2015) (observing the “essentially
equitable character of our charge”); Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon and Washington, 462 U.S. 1017, 1025 (1983)
(“[A]lthough existing legal entitlements are important factors in formulating an equitable decree, such legal rights
must give way in some circumstances to broader equitable considerations.”); Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S.
310, 315-17 (1984) (denying Colorado’s petition to apportion Vermejo River because it failed to “place in the
ultimate factfinder an abiding conviction that the truth of its factual contentions are ‘highly probable’”); New
Jersey v. New York et al., 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931) (“Different considerations come in when we are dealing with
independent sovereigns having to regard the welfare of the whole population and when the alternative to
settlement is war.”).
253
See U.S. Const., art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (listing six party-alignment “controversies” to which “[t]he judicial Power shall
extend”); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 378 (1821).
249
250
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adjudication and exposition of federal law. 254 Each function requires a final arbiter in its own
right, 255 but they are distinct institutionally. 256 Their relationships are matters of perennial (if not
interminable) debate among federal courts enthusiasts. 257 Even a rudimentary sense of this
divide, however, reveals that judgments can conclusively bind only those party to them. 258 We
could scarcely make sense of the Constitution’s separation of powers or federalism were it
otherwise. Second, precedent may bind future adjudicators. 259 And preclusion law may span this

See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound
and interpret that rule.”). This interpretation of Article III has multiple variants as well. See Dorf, supra note 208,
2000-2024, 2053-60 (contrasting a narrowing, “facts-plus-outcome” approach to precedent often employed by
federal courts with a more encompassing “facts-plus-holding” approach elevating given reasons to the core of
Article III judging).
255
See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359,
1381 (1997) (arguing that to deny the Constitution a final interpreter like the Supreme Court would deprive it of its
reason for being); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15
Cardozo L. Rev. 43, 75-78 (1993) (Merrill, Opinions) (same); Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 227,
227 (1990); Monaghan, Stare Decisis, supra note 155, at 755-67.
Professor Fallon teased the two apart in a recent book. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Law and Legitimacy in
the Supreme Court (2018). His account of the Court as final arbiter of federal law was that the “ultimate measure
of legality . . . inheres in currently accepted standards for identifying past events as possessing legal authority.” Id.
at 85 (emphasis added). That, of course, includes the Court’s own decisions, see id. at 135, but only if the Court
itself acknowledges that it makes law when it decides—precisely what so many of the Court’s interstate waters
opinions leave in doubt.
256
On this functional divide, see Kevin C. Walsh, Judicial Departmentalism: An Introduction, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
1713, 1724-27 (2017); Pushaw, supra note 108, at 495; Pfander, Rethinking, supra note 18, at 598-617; Bandes,
supra note 255, at 283; Merrill, Opinions, supra note 255, at 45-49; Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of
Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205, 259-69 (1985); Hart, supra note 70,
at 489-91, 541-42.
257
See Walsh, supra note 256, at 1719-22.
258
Cf. Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2184- 86 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing a fundamental
core of adjudicative power as the “disposition” of the interests properly at stake in a contest and distinguishing
between “private” and “public” rights’ adjudication); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (holding
that a federal statute requiring federal courts to reopen final judgments violated Article III); Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (“[t]he province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals”);
compare Fallon et al., supra note 182, at 50-56, 73-76 (describing the emergence of the ban on advisory opinions
and Marbury’s separation of law declaration from dispute resolution as principal elements in the earliest
interpretations of Article III), with William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 Geo. L.J. 1807, 1845 (2008) (“Judicial
opinions cannot claim authority from the same sources as judicial judgments do. Judgments derive their authority
from the combination of judicial power and jurisdiction enshrined by the originally understood text and structure
of the Constitution. Opinions must find another path to authority, if they find one at all.”).
259
See, e.g., John Bell, Precedent, in The New Oxford Companion to Law 923, 923 (Peter Cane & Joanne Conaghan
eds., 2008) (stating that a case’s holding and ratio decidendi (“reason for deciding”) comprise a precedent and
offering four chief criteria for identifying the latter); Dorf, supra note 208, at 2049-49 (arguing that a holding
includes any part of a rationale necessary to decision).
254
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entire divide—as it often has where legal interests are fully and fairly represented in prior
proceedings. 260 But it would make no sense to require for Article III’s sake that parties seeking
relief show an injury traceable to the defendant’s conduct that is remediable by the court unless
the adjudicative powers of that court reached no further. 261 Standing, jurisdiction, the law of
remedies, the law of judgments—none of it makes sense if what a court is doing in resolving a
dispute is making law. 262 This functional division is a useful filter through which to strain the
Court’s past work on states’ interests in interstate waters. Section A does so for claims before the
Court while Section B attacks the accommodation of rival sovereign interests in inferior courts of
competent jurisdiction.

A. Cases from Controversies: Rules of Decision as Horizontal and Vertical Choices of Law

See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940) (“It is familiar doctrine of the federal courts that members
of a class not present as parties to the litigation may be bound by the judgment where they are in fact adequately
represented by parties who are present.”); Restatement (2d) Judgments § 41 (1982) (“A person who is not a party
to an action but who is represented by a party is bound by and entitled to the benefits of a judgment as though he
were a party.”).
261
See Walsh, supra note 256, at 1729 (discussing the boundary of that which is coram non judice or “not before a
judge”); see also Bandes, supra note 255, at 277-81 (noting that the modern Supreme Court has increasingly
gravitated toward a “private rights” model of adjudication where the rights of the parties to the suit are the
paramount concern); Merrill, Opinions, supra note 255, at 49 (“Until fairly recently, the conventional wisdom in the
legal academy appeared to be that statements of law in judicial opinions are binding only on the parties to the
judgment under the rules of res judicata and on the courts themselves under principles of stare decisis.”); Baude,
supra note 258, at 1815-41 (same). Where the point has arisen in interstate waters cases, the Court has never
suggested anything to the contrary. See, e.g., New York v. Illinois et al. 274 U.S. 488, 490 (1927) (“We are not at
liberty to consider abstract questions.”); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 462 (1931) (holding that the case failed
“because it is based, not on any actual or threatened impairment of Arizona’s rights, but upon assumed potential
invasions”).
262
Cf. Fallon et al., supra note 182, at 52 (“The prohibition against advisory opinions has been termed the oldest
and most consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability.”); Merrill, Opinions, supra note 255, at 65-67
(arguing that the most expansive conceptions of judicial authority make “every judicial judgment a ‘de facto class
action’” without adherence to the notice or representation safeguards of Federal Rule 23).
260
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The Court’s embrace of equity and, by implication, federal equity’s autonomy from state
law, 263 has anchored its original jurisdiction practice. 264 That authority seems bound only by the
Court’s capacity to form a majority. 265 And this punctuates some challenging questions now
engulfing the Court’s interstate waters jurisprudence—especially its opinions’ precedential
effects in later cases or controversies arising in inferior courts. First, how (if at all) are private
claimants bound by equitable apportionment opinions, decrees, and/or the denials thereof in
subsequent litigation? Second, is the United States bound if it was never party to a proceeding?
Third, may Congress rearrange or reorder these interests by statute? And finally, what force do
state law rights to a certain quality or quantity of water possess up- or downstream on interstate
waters?
In a word, although the record of adjudications in the original jurisdiction stems from
party-alignment (the presence of a defendant otherwise immune to the relief being sought), the
Court’s predominant mode of decision there has been to reconcile the law of the contending
states (“local law”), not to apply it. 266 The Court’s declared intentions have been to reveal

See Morley, supra note 12, at 230-43; Collins, supra note 12; Fletcher, supra note 197, at 1528-38; Farber, supra
note 135, at 542-44; Plater, supra note 135, at 524-25.
264
See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
265
This differs from the Founding perhaps only insofar as the Court’s law declaration function has become much
the more important of the two. Cf. Pushaw, supra note 108, at 504 (“Federalists understood that federal
jurisdiction over Article III “Controversies” turned solely on the presence of one of six party configurations listed,
regardless of the law involved.”); Grove, Vertical, supra note 140, at 54-55 (observing that “broad precedent
setting may be the only way that the Supreme Court can oversee lower courts” in subject matters it encounters
“but once or twice a decade”).
266
See Wyoming v. Colorado et al., 259 U.S. 419, 470 (1922) (concluding that because both states had adopted
prior appropriation as their law, its application to the controversy between them was just and equitable);
Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670 (1931) “[W]hile the municipal law relating to like questions
between individuals is to be taken into account, it is not to be deemed to have controlling weight.”); Washington v.
Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 525-28 (1936) (noting that if the uses of the river at issue had included offsite transfer, a
“different question” would be presented given that such “use is unlawful according to the rule in many courts”);
Nebraska v. Wyoming et al., 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945) (“Since Colorado, Wyoming, and Nebraska are appropriation
States, that principle would seem to be equally applicable here.”); Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 399-400
(1943); Montana v. Wyoming, 563 U.S. 368, 375-85 (2011). The Court has at least once noted the variability and
263
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equities from what the state-parties themselves have said should favor some claims on the
resource over others. 267 This has settled few if any broadly applicable rules of decision. 268
Indeed, the rival explanation has never been completely foreclosed: that the Court is actually
elevating shared local law into a common federal rule of decision. 269 Yet its uneven fusion of
law declaration and dispute resolution has grown increasingly self-referential over time. Its
continued attribution of this function to the equity side of the “judicial Power” 270 has muddled
both functions. 271 To move forward, the Court should order its compound task more like other
choices of law: stepwise. It should first identify and explain all the law that applies to the case or
controversy and then prioritize and order that law which ought to govern as necessary and
proper—whether by application or adoption but not by some indecipherable fusion of the two. 272

volatility of state water law in this connection. See Connecticut, 282 U.S. at 670 (noting that laws “that happen to
be effective for the time being in both States do not necessarily constitute a dependable guide or just basis for the
decision of controversies such as that here presented”).
267
See, e.g., Connecticut, 282 U.S. at 670 (“[W]hile the municipal law relating to like questions between individuals
is to be taken into account, it is not to be deemed to have controlling weight.”).
268
See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
269
See, e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 182 (1982) (“The laws of the contending States concerning
intrastate water disputes are an important consideration governing equitable apportionment. When, as in this
case, both States recognize the doctrine of prior appropriation, priority becomes the ‘guiding principle’ in an
allocation between competing States.”); Wyoming v. Colorado et al., 259 U.S. 419, 464 (1922) (noting that Kansas
v. Colorado was a “pioneer in its field” but that the opinion was “confined to a case in which the facts and the local
law of the two states” were unique). One early interpretation of Wyoming was that the Court had consulted each
state’s law of appropriation and had federalized a common rule of decision. See James E. Shernow, The Latent
Influence of Equity in Wyoming v. Colorado (1922), 2(1) Grt. Plains Res. 7, 20-21 (1992); Wehrli, supra note 146, at
14-15. Similarly, in the majority opinion in Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502 (2018), the Court recently declared
that, “[g]iven the laws of the States,” Florida and Georgia each had an equal right to make “reasonable use” of
their shared waters—tracing that notion to Justice Story’s riparianism chestnut, Tyler v. Wilkinson! See id at 2513
(citing Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827)).
270
U.S. Const., art. III, §§ 1, 2.
271
See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text. There is little reason to expect that more attention to the
equity/law divide will straighten things out. Cf. Morley, supra note 12, at 247-48 (discussing Guaranty Trust Co v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 101, 108 (1945), and noting that federal principles of equity continue to govern federal courts’
remedial choices following Erie, even in the diversity jurisdiction); Hill, Remedies, supra note 12 (arguing that
federal courts’ remedial powers to redress constitutional injuries are vested by Article III and need no statute
specifically authorizing them to act against officials who would interpret the law to violate a plaintiff’s rights).
272
On these two steps in choice of law methodology more generally, see Roosevelt, supra note 241, at 11; Wolff,
supra note 229, at 1884-85; Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 277, 293-319 (1990). On the
importance of distinguishing adoption from application in such choice situations, see Clermont, supra note 159.
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Doing that much would better enable other institutions—inferior courts, Congress, and the
executive—to identify actual rules of decision for resolving what are increasingly complex
disputes. And it could further measure and articulate the aggregate interests a State may claim in
shared waters by the only available means: clear holdings on contested issues. Idling these other
actors with cryptic choices—remedial or otherwise—wastes scarce human and natural capital. In
adjudicating the law, the first step is always to distinguish law from non-law and the second is to
distinguish the horizontal from vertical conflicts to be resolved. Let’s take things in that order.
1. ‘Procedural’ Common Law and Beyond. For any claim-processing, evidentiary, or
other recognizably procedural rules of decision, the Court possesses Article III and statutory
authorities to act. 273 This much is at least consonant with its traditions more generally. 274 Its past
opinions are at least robust guidance to the Court’s litigants if not necessarily the “law”

See Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502, 2512-13 (2018) (noting that Court is free to “mould the process it uses in
such a manner as in its judgment will best promote the purposes of justice”) (quoting Kentucky v. Dennison, 65
U.S. (24 How.) 66, 68 (1861)); Texas v. New Mexico, 138 S. Ct. 954, 958-60 (2018) (fashioning its own test for
allowing the United States to context compact claims to Río Grande flows); Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042,
1064 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., concurring and dissenting in part) (agreeing with the majority on its processing of
Kansas’ claims but disagreeing that its equitable discretion is sufficient to amend accounting procedures set forth
in the compact); South Carolina v. North Carolina, 558 U.S. 256 (2010) (declining to adopt Special Master’s
proposed rule for joinder of private parties); Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 130-31 (1987) (fashioning an
equitable money damages award for compact breach because “[s]pecific performance will not be compelled ‘if
under all the circumstances it would be inequitable to do so’”).
274
Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (“The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and
procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the [inferior federal courts].”); Shapiro, supra note 17, at 579 (listing
equitable discretion and federalism/comity as two of the four major headings of federal courts’ discretionary
control over jurisdiction); Merrill, Powers, supra note 128, at 24-27, 46-47 (distinguishing between federal courts’
authority to fashion “rules of decision” which Erie and later cases cast into doubt and authority for “procedural and
housekeeping rules for the conduct of litigation” which are conventionally accepted forms of adjudicative power);
Matasar & Bruch, supra note 85, at 1322-67 (tracing long histories of Court’s procedural common law, especially
docket-control norms like the refusal of jurisdiction in cases decided below on an “adequate and independent”
state law basis); Hartnett, supra note 109, at 1705-07 (tracing the Court’s claiming of authority to shape the issues
a writ of certiorari brings to the Court from any proceedings below).
273
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proper. 275 Any preemption from such rules would arguably be within the forum’s procedures. 276
Of course, procedural rules can have substantive significance. For example, because the Court
has consistently and emphatically held that the successful complainant-state in the original
jurisdiction must prove its injury of “serious magnitude” by “clear and convincing evidence,” 277
the preclusive effects of any adverse ruling by the Court ought not to reach related private claims
not saddled with such a proof burden. 278
Second, the bulk of the Court’s declarations in the original jurisdiction holdings suggest
that, as to the ultimate act of prioritizing rivalrous uses, there exists little governing judge-made
law. 279 The necessary (not to say sufficient) injury any state must plead and must prove to gain
effective relief may be found in those past holdings, 280 at least if the Court itself is to be bound

275
Cf. Linsley, supra note 93, at 42-50 (reviewing the Court’s many claim-processing norms, including burdens of
proof, joinder, and the requirement that States seek leave to file, and how outcome-determinative these
requirements have proven in past disputes).
276
Cf. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13 (1941) (holding that Rules Enabling Act’s proviso limiting Supreme
Court’s rulemaking authority to exclude changes to “substantive rights” does not reach “adjective law of judicial
procedure” like the taking of evidence); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-69 (1965) (holding that federal court
must apply Federal Rule 4(d) on service of process, not state law, even if “outcome determinative” because federal
procedural law rightly preempts inconsistent state law).
277
See, e.g., New York v. New Jersey et al., 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 362 U.S. 365, 387
(1923); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 522 (1936); Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 187-88 (1982);
Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502, 2514 (2018).
278
See Restatement (2d) Judgments § 28(4) (1982) (“[R]elitigation of the issue in a subsequent action between the
parties is not precluded [where t]he party against whom preclusion is sought had a significantly heavier burden of
persuasion with respect to the issue in the initial action than in the subsequent action. . . .”); cf. Ohio v. Wyandotte
Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 504 (1971) (noting that the Court’s reticence toward interstate nuisance suits is no
reason “to impose on [a plaintiff] an unusually high standard of proof” when what is really needed is a forum
better suited to litigating the claim(s)”).
279
See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
280
Cf. Fallon, supra note 17, at 1070-71 (finding that, despite sustained efforts by the Court, “its decisions reveal
that whether a plaintiff has suffered a judicially cognizable injury . . . frequently turns on the provision of law under
which a plaintiff seeks relief”). This leaves special masters and litigants to sift past opinions and select declarations
for present use in ordering the evidence comprising a litigation. For example, in Special Master Kelly’s December
2019 Report recommending dismissal of Florida’s case, he began his analysis of the equities of Georgia’s
consumption of Flint River flows “by observing that ‘[d]rinking and other domestic purposes are the highest uses of
water.’” Florida v. Georgia, No. 142 Orig., Report of the Special Master (Dec. 11, 2019), at 52, quoting Connecticut
v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 673 (1931). Metro-Atlanta’s consumptive withdrawals thereafter slipped into a
kind of safe harbor, see id. at 53 & n.33, one that Florida’s case never reached. See id. at 81 (recommending that
Georgia’s consumptive uses be deemed “reasonable”).

50

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3606721

by anything more than present exigencies. Logically, however, the interests articulated and acted
upon therein belong to all states equally—whether they sue in the Supreme Court or not. 281 State
interests stand independent of law, closer to sovereignty itself. And if such state interests are
ignored by inferior courts, that surely is a challenge to the Supreme Court’s Article III duty and
authority to interpret the Constitution finally.282
Asserting claims to shared waters against defendants outside a forum state’s territory may
implicate quasi-sovereign interests without necessarily requiring remedies against immune
(jurisdiction-defeating) parties. 283 The identities of necessary and sufficient defendant(s) is casespecific. Moreover, only states have duties to protect the public welfare and common heritage. 284
Nonetheless, adjudicating any such inter-jurisdictional claim to waters would entail recourse to

See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907) (“One cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the States to
each other, is that of equality of right.”).
282
Compare Caminker, Precedents, supra note 141, at 828-34 (arguing that Founders understood Article III’s usage
of “inferior” courts to imply the Supreme Court was the “ultimate arbiter of the meaning of federal law”), with
Dorf, supra note 208, at 2067 (“When judges and commentators argue that every aspect of a prior opinion except
the facts and outcome may be ignored as dicta, they implicitly assert that the process of public justification of
judicial decisions is an exercise in futility.”).
Inferior courts’ jurisdictions present strategic choices to would-be litigants. Suits in federal district court,
though otherwise within the subject matter jurisdiction, could run aground of basic standing’s elements if a State
were to act as a mere proxy. Cf. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982)
(“Quasi-sovereign interests stand apart from . . . private interests pursued by the State as a nominal party.”);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (“[E]ven when the plaintiff has alleged an injury sufficient to meet the
‘case or controversy’ requirement . . . the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and
cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”). Similarly, if the State does assert
some unique, quasi-sovereign interests establishing standing, it risks having that claim matched by an opposing
State’s interests, thereby defeating subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of
Memphis, 570 F.3d 625, 631-33 (5th Cir. 2009). This at least suggests that state courts may be better fit
jurisdictionally for some cases.
283
But cf. City of Memphis, 570 F.3d at 632-33 (holding that State’s suit claiming foreign city’s withdrawal from
common aquifer should be enjoined “necessarily” asserted “control over a portion of the interstate resource”
being utilized by the city “pursuant to” the law of the foreign state and affirming dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction).
284
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 548 U.S. 497, 521 (2007); Hessick, supra note 17, at 1935 (“Individuals do not have
the duty to protect the well-being of the state’s populace or the rightful status of a state. Instead, the state has
these responsibilities.”).
281
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some kind of trans-substantive principle(s) of law. 285 Any judgment in such a case, moreover,
would likely depend on interjurisdictional recognition for its enforcement. 286 This may not
distinguish such cases from so much other civil litigation today. But it does accentuate the
importance of forum selection and the interoperability of the law(s), if any, constraining the uses
at issue in any given action.
As to that intersection, the states’ quasi-sovereign interests must be determinative. These
interests surely differ from federal reservations of water now grounded in judge-made law across
the West. 287 But they are also similar. The (federal) judge-made law of federal reservations
preempts inconsistent state law regardless of forum. 288 And the Court has pointedly held that the
adjudication of federal reserved rights, whether denying or granting them, is a binding final
judgment. 289 In the rare instances it has even arguably finally denied an equitable apportionment,
it has come when the Court could not avoid sorting favored from disfavored private
transboundary claims. 290 On one hand, this should not be surprising. Protecting the States’ equal

See Douglas L. Grant & Bret C. Birdsong, Private Interstate Suits, in Waters and Water Rights at § 44.05 (3d ed.
2019). The highest hurdle in such litigation may be the territoriality of judicial jurisdiction—which has continued to
structure our courts’ effective reach. See id. at § 44.03; James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of
Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 Va. L. Rev. 169, 175-99 (2004) (tracing territorialist
service-of-process requirements’ origins to the Confederation and early Federal periods).
286
The Court has long held that Article IV’s Full Faith and Credit Clause and the full faith and credit statute both
require that non-forum state judgments be recognized if rendered with jurisdiction and by due process. See Durfee
v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 115 (1963); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940).
287
See Colburn, supra note 210, at 23-35.
288
See Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818-20 (1976) (observing that state
courts, no less than federal courts, are bound by federal reserved rights).
289
See, e.g., Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 129-34 (1983).
290
See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text. In Washington v. Oregon, Justice Cardozo’s opinion traced the
then-adjudicated water rights in the basin from within each state, setting up the alleged conflicts between the
rivalrous demands. See Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 520-29 (1936). That denial was conclusive. Likewise,
in Colorado v. New Mexico, Colorado’s proposed diversion by a single would-be industrial user was compared to
the extant irrigators in New Mexico and their adjudicated priorities under New Mexico law. See Colorado v. New
Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 317-21 (1984). That denial was conclusive as well.
285
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dignity should not entail rewriting their laws. 291 As Ward Bannister observed in the wake of the
very first decree, “[i]nterstate priority . . . is monopoly in favor of one state against the other, and
the percentage of the monopoly is in exact correspondence with the water called for by the
aggregate of those of its appropriations” superior in right to that claimed by the subordinated. 292
On the other hand, that the Court would conclusively deny a State its remedy only in such
contexts shows just how bound its attention has been to States’ interests in the fullest possible
scope and priority for their own laws. Each decree entered was at pains to define the enjoined
State’s obligations in the negative, leaving to the burdened state its allocation as so many private
duties. 293 That patterning should inform any transboundary claim in the inferior courts.
2. Toward a (Judge-Made) Law of State Interests in Inferior Courts. Hinderlider and
Erie jointly confirmed that state law in a multi-sovereign system will occasionally be rendered
inoperable by little or no federal law just for being among a plurality of otherwise applicable
state laws. 294 Of course that is no warrant to ignore the rest of the Constitution: separation of
powers, due process, and full faith and credit mandates remain intact. 295 But it is the rare state

The ‘dignified tribunal’ theory of the original jurisdiction has never explained matters within the Court’s
concurrent jurisdiction and says little about the law declaration function. See Pfander, Rethinking, supra note 18, at
571, 604-12. The Court has declared quite clearly that concurrent jurisdiction in inferior courts is to keep “what
was intended as a favor” from becoming a “burden.” Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 464 (1884). Exercise of that
jurisdiction by another Article III court—whatever the Supreme Court’s dignity—should not therefore deprive
states of the interests the Court has already declared, at least insofar as that (inferior) court’s own institutional
position permits.
292
Bannister, supra note 2, at 978; see also Josh Patashnik, Arizona v. California and the Equitable Apportionment
of Interstate Waterways, 56 Ariz. L. Rev. 1, 41-48 (2014).
293
See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text. Notably, the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over New York City’s
garbage dumping beyond U.S. territorial waters was sustained rather casually in Justice Butler’s opinion.
Jurisdiction was grounded in the situs of the harm and by the defendant’s willing appearance. See New Jersey v.
City of New York, 283 U.S. 473, 482 (1931). The decree was held in abeyance allowing the City to construct the
incinerators it had argued to the Court could replace its ocean dumping. See id. at 482-83. On July 1, 1934,
dumping was finally enjoined, beginning the City’s modern history of landfilling and incineration.
294
See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
295
See Roosevelt, supra note 241, at 6-15; Wolff, supra note 229, at 1851-78.
291
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law that confines its scope territorially, 296 leaving laws over shared resources to overlap and
potentially to intersect. This tasks its adjudicators first with determining the validity and
applicability of laws and second with assigning the priority conflicting laws may, shall, or shall
not receive. 297
The federal interests in an interstate dispute like this shift the second step into a federal
interstice, 298 albeit one with permanently uncertain foundations. 299 The lower federal courts may
be better suited institutionally than are state courts to operate in that interstice. They are not
expressions of the very plurality of sovereigns necessitating the interstice in the first place. 300
Basic water law illustrates why. 301 Accommodating rivalrous claims on the same shared asset,

Cf. Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 Yale L.J. 457, 484-85 (1924)
(arguing that sovereignty is only necessarily confined by other sovereignty).
297
Cf. Wolff, supra note 229, at 1884 (observing that the “core structural feature of choice of law” is “the
distinction between the geographic scope of state law, which is a matter of substantive state policy,” and the
“method of resolving conflicts when the laws of more than one state extend their geographic reach to cover a
given dispute,” which is a “question of interstate relations” and therefore sometimes a federal question). This
critique of the earlier orthodoxy in conflicts of law was a concerted rejection of the focus on the territorial location
in which rights and causes of action were said to “vest.” See Cook, supra note 296; David F. Cavers, A Critique of
the Choice of Law Problem, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 173 (1933).
298
One certain inference from the original jurisdiction opinions is that the Supreme Court has treated interstate
waters as wholes, i.e., that their governance is necessarily shared. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
Slicing waters up by jurisdictional boundaries, thus, would be to deny the Court’s clearest guidance on the nature
of these quasi-sovereign interests.
299
See supra note 177 and accompanying text. This has been true regardless of forum. Josh Patashnik, for example,
revealed from careful study of the justices’ papers and conferencing during Arizona v. California the considerable
difficulties they had agreeing about the force of the Boulder Canyon Project Act, their own past precedents, and
the common Western heritage of appropriative rights. See Patashnik, supra note 292.
300
See Field, supra note 229, at 933-34, 960-61; Hill, Preemption, supra note 211, at 1036-42. Note that this is less
about uniformity per se than self-dealing and the perception thereof. In most cases where a preemptive federal
interest has been found, state self-interest has been at least as important as any perceived need for national
uniformity. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Co., 487 U.S. 500, 504-12 (1988); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op.,
356 U.S. 525, 538-39 (1958); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943); D’Oench, Duhme & Co.
v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 471-72 (1942).
301
As Professor Dellapenna has long argued, the diversity of water rights and the patterning therein have stemmed
from continuous legal evolution driven by climate, topography, technology, and a wealth of other influences—to
say nothing of the specific adjudicators’ talents. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Evolution of Riparianism in the
United States, 95 Marq. L. Rev. 53 (2011). Where water has been comparatively abundant, resolving its conflicting
uses has mostly been consigned to after-the-fact dispute resolution. Id. at 53-55. Where water has been relatively
scarce or its utilization relatively capital-intensive, resolving allocative disputes with more assurances of legal
entitlement in advance of actual disputes has been required. Id. at 75-81.
296
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whether those claims are public or private, invariably necessitates both substantive and
procedural norms and meticulous fact-finding. 302 Federal courts are national yet decentralized
and organized around our federalism. They are bound to and expert at identifying and following
governing precedent, whether federal or state. 303 The progressive clarification of precedent is an
institutional imperative of our inferior federal courts—one that has made them indispensable to
the Supreme Court. 304 And whatever else a federal forum has going for or against it, it is at least
not the arm of a rival sovereign imposing its valuation of a common resource on another. 305 As
Judge Friendly observed in defense of Erie in 1964—and as federal reserved rights have
illustrated in contrast with quasi-sovereign state interests thus far—the “emergence of a federal
decisional law in areas of national concern that is truly uniform because, under the supremacy

See Joshua Getzler, A History of Water Rights at Common Law (2004) (reviewing a continuous co-evolution of
water rights and common law forums and procedures in England from the beginning of servitudes to the
establishment of modern riparian doctrines). It may be worth noting here that each of the three cases sweeping
away the holding that interstate compacts’ interpretation was not a federal question—the doctrine prompting
Hinderlider’s noted jurisdictional ruling—involved interstate river compacts. See Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge
Comm’n v. Colburn, 310 U.S. 419, 425-26 (1940); State ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 24 (1951); Petty v. Tenn.Missouri Bridge Comm’n, 359 U.S. 275, 278 (1959). As the Court reasoned in Sims, every such bargain presumes
that a “State cannot be its own ultimate judge in a controversy with a sister State.” Sims, 341 U.S. at 28. Federal
question jurisdiction thus not only assured some availability of an Article III forum (whether original or appellate).
See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438-42 (1981). It assured that the validity and terms of the states’ mutual
obligation(s)—which would not “rest upon the law of a particular State,” Sims, 341 U.S. at 27—could not be
amended unilaterally. Cf. Colburn, 310 U.S. at 431-33 (subordinating New Jersey’s general eminent domain statute
to the 1934 compact between New Jersey and Pennsylvania, reversing New Jersey court’s questionable
interpretation of Pennsylvania law on the point, and reversing that court’s inverse condemnation writ of
mandamus because Compact Commission had been created jointly and was not to be regarded as equivalent of
state agencies).
303
Compare Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535 (1983) (per curiam) (noting that
only the Supreme Court may overrule its own precedent and that, “[u]ntil that occurs, [it] is the law” lower federal
courts must follow), with Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) (explaining a federal court’s
obligation to follow the precedents of a state’s highest court and to give “due regard” to the decisions of its lower
courts).
304
See Re, supra note 143, at 951-66.
305
As the Court held in affirming EPA’s application of downstream Oklahoma’s water quality standards to a
discharge in upstream Arkansas (with its own water quality standards for the receiving river), there is no protecting
all sovereign interests in the case of conflicting valuations of a shared whole like a river. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma,
503 U.S. 91, 106-07 (1992). There are only so many “balance[s] among competing policies and interests.” Id. at
106.
302
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clause it is binding in every forum, and therefore is predictable and useful,” 306 could be
considerably better than that alternative. 307
So what of the federal interests in claims arising under state law? Recall that the Court’s
Wyandotte doctrine consigning most tort claims to inferior courts preceded Milwaukee II’s
holding that, at least as to discharged pollution to shared waters, 308 Congress had displaced all
federal judge-made (but not state) law by legislation. 309 This mirrored an earlier, similar
evolution on the obstruction or impoundment of interstate waters. 310 But recall finally that, from
Wheeling Bridge forward the Court refused to permit its jurisdiction to be used by a state to
project its law into or upon a sibling state. 311 In trading original jurisdiction for a role more
suited to its contemporary self, thus, the Court may have signaled a linkage between jurisdiction
and jurisprudence that is vital to aligning the proper choices of law: the Court’s holdings on
states’ quasi-sovereign interests in interstate waters, to whatever extent they are not procedural
common law and so bound to the Court-as-forum, 312 must be so much sub-constitutional

Henry J. Friendly, Jr., In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 383, 405 (1964).
See Colburn, supra note 210, at 62-65. Of course, federal judge-made law comes within the Supremacy Clause
only if it is at least arguably constitutional or statutory at base. See Monaghan, Textualism, supra note 200, at 74853; Hill, Preemption, supra note 211, at 1030-35.
308
Then-Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Milwaukee II focused on permitted discharges that were at issue in the
litigation, holding that “[f]ederal courts lack authority to impose more stringent effluent limitations under federal
common law” than those imposed administratively. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 350
(1981). Note, too, that “irrigation return flows,” like so many other influences that systematically degrade the
quality and/or quantity of shared rivers, are specifically excluded from the statute’s reach.
309
See supra notes 193-97 and accompanying text. The leading treatise suggests that the simplest work-around for
private claimants with cross-jurisdictional claims is to plead their cases in tort to avoid any implication that a “local
action” involving out-of-state water rights is demanded (given involvement of immovable property). See Grant &
Birdsong, supra note 285, at § 44.04(a).
310
See supra notes 166, 173 and accompanying text.
311
See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
312
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
306
307
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preemption of state law that orders states’ rivalrous interests unless and until those holdings are
displaced by valid positive federal law. 313
There are several reasons to draw this conclusion. First, it is as to the conflicting quasisovereign interests—which must be “reconciled as best they may” 314—that states lack the
legislative capacities Erie presumed and by which the specialized federal interests described
above emerge. 315 Once articulated, these interests are real and not hypothetical. Second,
Congress’s rebalancing these interests in interstate waters, as seen in Wheeling Bridge II, 316
Arizona v. California,317 and throughout the appellate docket, 318 has been determinative
wherever the legislation has not defied a Court decree. 319 Third, state law specifying these
interests has evaded preemption just as well wherever no necessary conflicts have arisen. 320

Cf. Hill, Preemption, supra note 211, at 1055 (observing that the “creative aspect” of the adjudicative role
cannot be ignored or eliminated because, although the judiciary is “subordinate to the political branches,” that
subordinacy “bespeaks the supremacy of the political branches, but not their sufficiency”); Manning, supra note
82, at 1729-31 (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment’s purposes have figured prominently in the Court’s
interpretation of state sovereign immunity and Article III and that this hardened into constitutional restrictions on
state court jurisdiction over states). Even some skeptical of Article III law-making power in those “controversies”
falling within its menu of party-configuration subject matter jurisdiction have found within the Court’s approach to
its own precedents ample authority for such federal judge-made law. See, e.g., Nelson, Legitimacy, supra note 229,
at 63-64.
314
New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931).
315
These are the hallmarks of legitimate federal judge-made law—even among skeptics. See Clark, supra note 211,
at 1271-75; cf. Nelson, Legitimacy, supra note 229, at 2-4, 44-45 (analyzing Justice Scalia’s approach in Boyle v.
United Techs. Co., 487 U.S. 500 (1988), holding that state legislative authority was foreclosed and unique federal
interests were in issue); Hill, Preemption, supra note 211, at 1080-81 (connecting the legitimate enclaves of federal
judge-made law to areas in which state authority must be foreclosed); Clark, supra note 211, at 1271 (same).
316
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. 518 (1852).
317
373 U.S. 546 (1963).
318
See, e.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101-03 (1992); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee et al., 406 U.S. 91, 10001 (1972); First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 328 U.S. 152, 160-62 (1946); Oklahoma ex rel.
Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 521-28 (1941); Sanitary Dist. Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405,
425-27 (1925); Monongahela Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 177, 193-95 (1910); Union Bridge Co. v. United States,
204 U.S. 364, 401-02 (1907); Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co. v. United States, 174 U.S. 690, 709-10 (1899); Cooley v. Bd.
of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 316-20 (1851); Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (13 How.) 212, 221-24 (1845);
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 120-25 (1824).
319
See supra notes 60, 96-97, and accompanying text.
320
This approach to reconciling state and federal statutes on shared waters interests was first fashioned in Cooley
v. Board of Wardens. See Robertson, supra note 11, at 166, 256 (calling Cooley’s approach a “process of
313
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Finally, interstate compacts meet no mention in the Supremacy Clause and yet the Court has
afforded them a congruent priority. 321 Hinderlider did not invent that sort of judicially adapted
preemption. 322 It simply epitomized it. All in all, then, preemptive federal interests bar a state
from ignoring its duties to the Union even if those duties have not yet been expressed in valid
positive law.
Importantly, though, Congress can override federal judge-made law only if Congress can
recognize it as such. 323 It often seems as if the Court itself welcomes Congress to such work.
And the Court would undoubtedly draw focused attention to its own law-making were it to hold
that Congress’s rebalancing of interstate waters’ benefits or burdens is as constrained by old

accommodation”); Swisher, supra note 53, at 422 (same); see also Grove, supra note 17, at 859-85 (showing the
breadth of state standing to sue the United States protecting the enforceability of state law). By the time equitable
apportionments like the lower Colorado’s involved compacts, federal statutes, adjudicated federal reservations,
and adjudicated state law rights, there was no longer any question that an adjudication thereof bound all parties’
interests as so judged not because the facts as found were conclusive—but because the declared law of the
controversy was. See Arizona v. California et al., 460 U.S. 605, 615-28 (1983).
321
See Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983) (“[U]nless the compact to which Congress has consented is
somehow unconstitutional, no court may order relief inconsistent with its express terms.”). Of course, “Federal law
is enforceable in state court not because Congress has determined that federal courts would otherwise be
burdened or that state courts might provide a more convenient forum . . . but because the Constitution and laws
passed pursuant to it are as much laws in the States as laws passed by the state legislature.” Howlett v. Rose, 496
U.S. 356, 367 (1990). The original jurisdiction has shifted noticeably toward disputes over the meaning or scope of
interstate compacts. Of the eleven full opinion decisions since the Colorado River Compact structured the Court’s
decision in Arizona v. California et al., 373 U.S. 546 (1963), six have been compact disputes. See Texas, 462 U.S.
554; Oklahoma and Texas v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221 (1991); Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56 (2003); Montana v.
Wyoming, 563 U.S. 368 (2011); Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042 (2015); Texas v. New Mexico and Colorado, 138
S. Ct. 954 (2018). Note that, as compared to the five (arguably six) basins where a decree has ever been entered,
there are over twenty basins with an interstate allocation compact approved by Congress and at least a dozen
more with compacts for managing pollution, navigation, impoundment, etc. See Sherk, supra note 134.
322
See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438-42 (1981) (discussing Wheeling Bridge I’s legacy); State ex rel. Dyer v.
Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 29-32 (1951).
323
See Green, supra note 199, at 1285. If, by contrast, the Court’s equitable apportionment opinions declare
interests or rules of decision that are constitutionally required, then Congress’s authority to override or eliminate
would be correspondingly reduced. See Monaghan, Foreword, supra note 103, at 14-17. But one of the reasons for
better clarity about the choice-of-law methods employed by the Court is to better signal its co-equal branches
what has and has not been conclusively adjudicated.
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opinions as by a formally entered decree. 324 This it has been reluctant to do, 325 probably for good
reason. 326 When the Court set aside the Secretary of War’s permit for Chicago’s Lake Michigan
diversions, 327 it tacitly confirmed that its jurisdiction is protective of sovereign interests
regardless of then-extant positive federal law. 328 But there is an important caveat. The notion that
the executive branch is free to disregard the Court’s past interpretations of the several states’
equal sovereignty merely by declining party status in a suit over a particular resource is not the
law, has never been the law, and should not be the law. 329 Congressional and executive
prerogatives versus Article III are two different structural equations.

324
If “[j]udicial supremacy is . . . the idea that the Constitution means for everybody what the Supreme Court says
it means in deciding a case,” Walsh, supra note 256, at 1715, a judicial supremacist would hold that the Court’s
declarations on state interests in interstate waters supersede even later federal legislation and compacts on those
interests. The Court itself has rejected such absolutist thinking in the past. See, e.g., Arizona v. California et al., 373
U.S. 546, 565-66 (1963).
325
See supra notes 54-64, 96-97 and accompanying text.
326
Cf. Fallon, supra note 255, at 159-65 (making the case for judicial restraint in the face of state and federal
legislation deviating from judicial opinions); Walsh, supra note 256, at 1741 (“[O]ver time, judicial supremacy will
result more and more in supremacy that is less and less judicial.”); Merrill, Opinions, supra note 255, at 77-78
(contrasting an “authoritarian” approach to judicial opinion writing and interpretation to one in which opinions are
understood as explanations of judgments meant only to influence nonjudicial actors and suggesting in the former a
tendency to “stultify the capacities of the politically accountable institutions to engage in interpretation”).
327
See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
328
Congressional displacement of past Supreme Court holdings on states’ quasi-sovereign interests, in short, must
be explicit and definitive—or the legislation will surely be assimilated to the jurisprudence by any inferior court
bound by both. See, e.g., Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 777-78 (7th Cir. 2011). Of course, as
to any decrees binding states-as-states, no Article II actor would be free to interfere with or frustrate the Court’s
ordered relief. See Baude, supra note 258, at 1840-41, 1853-61.
329
See Wisconsin et al. v. Illinois et al., 278 U.S. 367, 416-21 (1929) (holding that, even without the United States a
party, the permit granted to Illinois and the Chicago Sanitary District would be set aside and the Court would be
responsible for balancing the interests of the concerned states); cf. Litman, supra note 20, at 1242-52; Grove,
Vertical supra note 140, at 57-58 (contrasting Chief Justice Roberts’ view that narrow opinions focused on the
precise dispute before the Court should be the Court’s norm with the view that the role of the Supreme Court is to
establish precedents that guide all other courts); Fallon, supra note 255, at 105-20 (arguing that each of the
Constitution’s institutions have “external” constraints on them imposed by the others, chiefly for the Court the
adoption of constitutional interpretations that finally state the law); Dorf, supra note 208, at 2029-49 (arguing that
Article III’s case/controversy requirement embraces a broad understanding of a court’s holding to include the
court’s reasons); Merrill, Opinions, supra note 255, at 67-70 (arguing that a “predictive theory” of opinions leads to
a broad scope for their effect beyond the parties to the dispute).
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Finally, as content as the Court has been to accede to federal statutes and interstate
compacts on pollution 330 and flood control, 331 the diversion, delivery, and consumption of waters
has remained considerably more the province of state law and jurisdiction. 332 The statutes
empowering the Bureau of Reclamation, Corps of Engineers, and other agencies managing
appropriated water are notorious for “saving” state law water rights and powers from
preemption. 333 Inferior courts, being within the Supreme Court’s revisory jurisdiction in all
matters presenting substantial federal questions, 334 stand before the Court’s precedents apart
from both Congress and the executive branch. Any inferior court giving extraterritorial effect to a
forum-state law or judgment may frustrate the derivative federal interests here—especially with
equitable relief—so it is this context where the distinct interests at stake become the most
difficult to sort and prioritize. Section B turns to that set of challenges.

B. Cross-State Claims to Shared Waters: Rethinking Extraterritoriality

Cf. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 99-101 (1992) (observing that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
preempted actions based on the law of the affected state, displaced federal common law, and that the only other
law applicable to pollution discharges to interstate waters was “the law of the State in which the point source is
located”).
331
See, e.g., South Dakota v. Nebraska, 485 U.S. 902 (1988) (denying leave to file suit challenging management of
flood control projects on Missouri River); State of Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson, 313 U.S. 508, 516-35
(1941) (reviewing federal interests in flood control on Red and Mississippi rivers and rejecting challenges to federal
statute).
332
See Lawrence J. MacDonnell, General Stream Adjudications, the McCarran Amendment, and Reserved Water
Rights, 15 Wyo. L. Rev. 313 (2015); cf. Envtl. Law Inst., At the Confluence of the Clean Water Act and Prior
Appropriation 4-12 (2013) (detailing the Federal Water Pollution Control Act’s rise, its drafters’ strategic exclusion
of water “quantity” from the subject matters delegated to federal regulators, and the interrelations of water
quality and water quantity in actual surface water governance); Thomas H. Pacheco, How Big Is Big? The Scope of
Water Rights Suit Under the McCarran Amendment, 15 Ecol. L.Q. 627 (1988).
333
See Reed D. Benson, Reviewing Reservoir Operations: Can Federal Water Projects Adapt to Change?, 42 Colum.
J. Env’tl L. 353, 368-78 (2017); Reed D. Benson, Whose Water Is It? Private Rights and Public Authority Over
Reclamation Project Water, 16 Va. Env’tl L.J. 363, 374-382 (1997). The era of “general stream adjudications” in
which the interrelated water rights of in-state users were adjudicated by a single tribunal yielded a tremendous
judicial investment and many “adjudicated” water rights that came at a dear cost. See Joseph M. Feller, The
Adjudication that Ate Arizona Water Law, 49 Ariz. L. Rev. 205 (2007). But as Wheeling Bridge itself illustrated,
states can and do enact statutes aimed at denying a sibling state its due uses of shared waters.
334
See Matasar & Bruch, supra note 85, at 1346-50.
330
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Coincidentally, as equitable apportionments were spurring arid states into action sorting
out domestic water rights through stream adjudications, 335 the Supreme Court was renovating the
rules of inter-jurisdictional litigation more generally. 336 State courts’ pursuit of their own
independence meant horizontal frictions. 337 Distinct but related frictions were also confronted on
the territoriality of state legislation. 338 As these foundations were reset, however, one net effect
was the practical elimination of transboundary water rights litigation. But that is a trend the
Court’s interstate waters jurisprudence as a whole may soon disrupt. For states clearly have
legitimate constitutional interests in a quality and quantity of advantage not being denied their
residents at their borders as the collateral effect of another state’s laws.
1. Constitutional (Judge-Made) Choices of Law. In the decades surrounding Erie, the
Court fashioned several constraints on a forum’s extraterritorial application of its own laws. 339
While first hinting that these constraints might be quite robust, 340 they were eventually settled as

See Pacheco, supra note 332, at 635-43; John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters: A Century of
Adjudicating Rivers and Streams, Part II, 9 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 299, 305-06 (2006).
336
See Clyde Spillenger, Risk Regulation, Extraterritoriality, and Domicile: The Constitutionalization of American
Choice of Law, 1850-1940, 62 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1240, 1314-25 (2015) (discussing Home Ins. Co., 281 U.S. 397;
Clapper, 286 U.S. 145; Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. 532; John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178
(1936); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939)).
337
See Wolff, supra note 229, at 1881 (“[T]he 1930s brought a series of decisions in which the Court defined more
aggressive constitutional limitations on state choice of law, raising the prospect of a significantly increased federal
role in supervising state choice-of-law policy.”).
338
See Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the Extraterritoriality Principle in
Choice of Law, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1057, 1075-92 (2009) (discussing So. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945);
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. 624 (1982); Phillips Petro. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985)).
339
See Wolff, supra note 229, at 1884 (“During the 1930s, the Court reframed the constitutional limits on state
choice of law around governmental interests and the avoidance of unfair surprise to litigants.”); Brainerd Currie,
The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 9, 75
(1958) (concluding from an exhaustive survey that “a state court’s choice of law will be upset under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause or the Due Process Clause only when the state whose law is applied has no legitimate interest in
its application”). Here, too, Brandeis exerted considerable influence. See id. at 23-30; Spillenger, supra note 336, at
1297-1318.
340
See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407-10 (1930); Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145,
162 (1932); Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 539-50 (1935); Broderick v. Rosner, 294
U.S. 629, 642-45 (1935).
335
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modest, specific checks grounded in fairness to individuals and in other states’ interests in their
own laws’ scope and priority. 341 Interstate suits were growing more common and older, prepositivist theories of law were fading. Civil litigation increasingly meant a forum state’s choiceof-law rules had to determine whether foreign or forum law should apply. 342 With jurisdiction
over defendant(s), however, the sorting of sovereign interests in interstate waters, whether
vertically or horizontally, entailed the existence of a federalized interstice which, in turn, fell into
the Supreme Court’s revisory jurisdiction. 343
Even before Kansas v. Colorado 344 ever sparked the equitable apportionment ideal or the
tradition it became, private interstate claims had forced courts to reconcile potentially rivalrous
interests in interstate waters. 345 The Court’s own leading case, Bean v. Morris, 346 was decided
the year Wyoming v. Colorado was filed. 347 In Bean, a downstream-state appropriator suing an

See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722-29 (1988); see also Florey, supra note 338, at 1068-82; Louise
Weinberg, Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 440, 448 (1982); Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Roles of
Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 94, 119-28 ((1976); Currie, supra note
339.
342
See Spillenger, supra note 336, at 1274-1325; Wolff, supra note 229, at 1849-51; Florey, supra note 338, at
1068-72; Kramer, supra note 272, at 319-38. Erie carried the duty over to federal courts. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (holding that the law providing the cause of action should provide the choice of
law rules in ordinary diversity cases); Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 497, 502-04 (1941).
343
Compare Enter. Irr. Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 163-64 (1917) (holding the Court lacked
jurisdiction to review appropriators’ dispute arising wholly under state law and not presenting an independent,
substantial federal question), with Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 230-34 & n.7 (1948) (recognizing the
Full Faith and Credit Clause as a basis for a federal common law rule of reconciling judgments interstate). This
patterning has been explicit in some original jurisdiction opinions. See, e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176,
182-83 & n.9 (1982) (noting Colorado’s interest in interstate stream and how that interest countered downstream
state’s interest in its appropriators’ senior rights). But there remain state interests that cannot be vindicated at all.
See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 421 (2003) (“A State cannot punish a defendant for
the conduct that may have been lawful where it occurred.”) (citing BMW of No. Amer., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,
572 (1996)).
344
185 U.S. 125 (1902).
345
See, e.g., Conant v. Deep Creek & Curlew Valley Irr. Co., 66 P. 188 (Utah 1901); Howell v. Johnson, 89 F. 556,
559-60 (D. Mont. 1898); Union Mill & Mining Co. v. Dangberg, 81 F. 73 (D. Nev. 1897).
346
221 U.S. 485 (1911). Bean was exalted as a “leading case involving the doctrine of prior appropriation” in
Arizona v. California et al., 373 U.S. 546, 581 n.82 (1963), and noted several times as the emphatic rejection of the
so-called ‘Harmon doctrine’ in Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 466-68 (1922).
347
See Tyler, supra note 157, at 15.
341
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upstream-state appropriator alleged a prohibited diversion in the upstream state’s federal court
(sitting in diversity). 348 The Montana defendant answered that the Wyoming plaintiff did not
have a right valid under Wyoming law—which had to be adjudicated given that entitlement’s
necessity for the court’s jurisdiction to hear the case. 349 Applying Wyoming law, the district
court found the plaintiff’s right valid and then concluded that, because both states maintained
similar approaches to appropriations, it would enjoin the out-of-priority diversions. 350 In
affirming, the Supreme Court agreed that “in the absence of legislation,” the two states should be
presumed to allow “the same rights to be acquired from outside the state that could be acquired
from within.” 351 To Justice Holmes for the Court, thus, a litigant’s water right could be asserted
as far upstream as it may reach: state boundaries should not erase a liability stemming from that
right if each state’s laws governing the water made it a liability. 352

See Morris v. Bean, 146 F. 423, 425-28 (Cir. Ct. Mont. 1906).
See Morris, 146 F. at 426-29. The amount-in-controversy requirement could not be fulfilled without this
underlying entitlement’s jeopardy. The court ultimately concluded its jurisdictional inquiry that “complainant is an
appropriator [under Wyoming law], fully invested with all the rights attaching to that interest in property.” Id. at
429.
350
See Morris, 146 F. at 429-31 (holding that the Wyoming appropriator had a property right at stake and that the
jurisdictional amount in controversy requirement was met).
351
Bean, 221 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added); see also Bean v. Morris, 159 F. 651, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1908). Holmes’
nod to the potential difference legislation could make may have been an acknowledgement that states could, with
the right show of positive jurisdictional effort, at least assert unique state interests. The facts in Bean presented no
such effort, however.
352
221 U.S. at 487. The Court prefaced its holding by acknowledging that the private rights of appropriators in the
upstream states were “subject to such rights as the lower state might be decided by this court to have, and to
vested private rights, if any, protected by the Constitution. . . .” Id. at 486 (emphasis added). This of course suggests
a difference of right. But, as we have seen, while it may be a difference of claim/relief and eligible forums, it is not
necessarily a divergence of the underlying interest(s) at issue.
348
349
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Bean’s choice-of-law approach 353 anticipated the synthesis to be had from Erie, the
equitable apportionment tradition, and the Court’s late doctrines on extraterritoriality. 354 Bean
was an attempt to accommodate rival sovereign interests through the adjudication of legal
entitlements to a common resource. If the concerned states shared a common rule, a federal court
sitting in diversity was obliged to apply that rule. 355 Several inferior courts, some of them state
courts, had settled on a similar approach. 356 Again in Rickey Land v. Miller & Lux 357 and again a
decade later in Weiland v. Pioneer Irrigation Co. (the day Wyoming v. Colorado was decided), 358
the Court reiterated that inferior courts with jurisdiction were obliged to assess the laws
governing the quality and quantity of interstate waters and that with conflict came a kind of
federal interstice tasking that adjudicator with identifying the specific rule(s) of decision. 359 With
Bean is, essentially, a conflicts case. See Grant & Birdsong, supra note 285, at § 44.05(a)(2). As Grant and
Birdsong astutely note, it echoed a decision Holmes authored while serving on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court. See Mannville Co. v. City of Worcester, 138 Mass. 89 (1884).
354
Holmes’s opinion in Bean surely illustrated a territorialist, “vested rights” view of choices of law—a theory later
conflicts work rejected. See Currie, supra note 339; Spillenger, supra note 336, at 1274-91. As the Court would
later make clear, statutes’ extraterritorial effects are limited by due process and full faith and credit curbs as well.
See Florey, supra note 338, at 1084-92 (discussing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of Amer., 481 U.S. 69 (1987)).
355
Cf. Rickey Land, 218 U.S. at 262 (noting that “[f]ull justice cannot be done and anomalous results avoided unless
all the rights of the parties before the court in virtue of the jurisdiction . . . acquired are taken in hand”); Union
Mill, 81 F. at 87-89, 95-96 (noting equity jurisdiction to determine rights of parties to interstate stream and afford
relief as appropriate to court’s jurisdiction over the parties and citing “general principles” of “universal application”
throughout the western states).
356
See Taylor v. Hulett, 97 P. 37 (Idaho 1908); Anderson v. Bassman, 140 F. 14, 28-29 (N.D. Cal. 1905); Howell v.
Johnson, 89 F. 556, 559-60 (D. Mont. 1898). In one of the cases, Hoge v. Eaton, 135 F. 411 (D. Colo. 1905), the
court found jurisdiction and enjoined the out-of-priority appropriators but was reversed on appeal for an
insufficient amount in controversy, defeating diversity jurisdiction. See Eaton v. Hoge, 141 F. 64, 66 (8th Cir. 1905).
In Willey v. Decker, 73 P. 210 (Wyo. 1903), the Wyoming Supreme Court in a lengthy, at times rambling opinion,
concluded that Montana and Wyoming’s doctrines allowed an appropriator to “secure a valid water right” that
would operate across state boundaries. Id. at 222. It declined finally to resolve what type of action was being
adjudicated—contenting itself to find a valid underlying right and jurisdiction sufficient to enforce that right. See
id. at 224.
357
218 U.S. 258 (1910).
358
259 U.S. 498 (1922).
359
Cf. Grant & Birdsong, supra note 285, at § 44.01 (concluding that “the law governing private suits” was “settled”
to this effect). In Pioneer, the Court noted that both lower courts had agreed “the state line did not affect the
superiority of right,” 259 U.S. at 502, adding that any claim that Colorado owned the river’s flow rising within its
territory had been “fully disposed of on principle and authority.” 259 U.S. at 502-03. The Court declared that the
353
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jurisdiction over defendant(s), 360 a court should enjoin violations of any shared rule. 361 This
decoupled the legal situs of the entitlements being pressed—or any property thereby
advantaged—from territorial authority as such. 362 No irreconcilable conflict emerged in those
three cases. 363 But this was the approach conflicts scholars like Cook, Cavers, Currie, and others
elevated over the naïve territorialism that had dominated conflicts of law to then. 364 A shared

decree below “necessarily rested not upon Colorado laws or decisions which attempted to deny the asserted right
to the use of the water in Nebraska nor upon Nebraska laws or decisions which could not be effective in Colorado,
but upon rights secured to the appellee by the Constitution of the United States.” Id. at 502 (citing Wyoming v.
Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922)). This element supported the Court’s jurisdiction to hear the appeal regardless of
diversity (which had been challenged). The relevant ‘arising under’ jurisdictional statute then, as now, required
that a motion to dismiss succeed unless the claim included some substantial federal law element. See, e.g., Smith
v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921); Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g and Mfg., 545
U.S. 308 (2005).
360
See Conant v. Deep Creek & Curlew Valley Irr. Co., 66 P. 188, 190 (Utah 1901) (noting that upstream state court
had no jurisdiction to determine downstream state’s users’ rights to stream “as between themselves”). The rise of
long-arm jurisdictional statutes eventually prompted the clarification that forum states’ reach over claims involving
absent defendants depends at least in part on that state’s interests in the dispute. See Worldwide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 US. 286, 292 (1980). Of course, as pre-Erie diversity suits, neither Bean, Rickey, nor Pioneer
dwelled on the federal court’s territorial relationship to the forum state as such.
361
This was, in fact, extended to cases where a defendant’s water diversion was outside the jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
The Salton Sea Cases, 172 F. 820, 811-13 (9th Cir. 1909) (upholding assertion of jurisdiction over defendant’s canal
in Mexico); Taylor v. Hulett, 97 P. 37, 40 (Idaho 1908); cf. Union Mill & Mining Co. v. Dangberg, 81 F. 73, 88-90 (D.
Nev. 1897) (declaring that federal equitable principles must decide whether upstream users in California should be
joined as necessary and indispensable defendants in suit between Nevada users); but cf. Howell v. Johnson, 89 F.
556, 559-60 (D. Mont. 1898) (rejecting claim that junior downstream-state appropriator could assert downstream
state’s interests against first-in-time upstream state appropriator to defeat senior rights to non-navigable stream).
362
Bean’s holding necessarily rested on some entitlement(s) in the affected parties—as in the equitable
apportionments---fulfilling Article III’s prerequisites. Cf. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480 (1923)
(companion case to Massachusetts v. Mellon, dismissed for a lack of capacity to make claim); Fairchild v. Hughes,
258 U.S. 126, 128-29 (1922). The “standing” precedents construing Article III were, however, still decades in the
future. See Wright & Kane, supra note 229, at 69 & n.9 (noting that the notion of “standing” first materialized in
discussions of Article III only mid-way through the Twentieth century). But Bean departed not at all from the
territorialist jurisdictional tradition. See Albion-Idaho Land Co. v. Naf Irr. Co., 97 F.2d 439, 443 & n.3 (1938).
363
Indeed, its jurisdiction and the lack of an irreconcilable conflict in the cases kept the Court from having to
confront hard questions arising where the states’ laws conflict and the forum’s remedial reach becomes decisive.
See Brooks v. United States, 119 F.2d 636, 638-41 (9th Cir. 1941); cf. Albion-Idaho, 97 F.2d at 444 (fashioning a
futile call doctrine from the law of the opposing states).
364
Cook’s seminal 1924 article emphasized the forum’s autonomy in identifying foreign law that it may choose to
adopt even while purporting simply to apply such law. See Cook, supra note 296, at 469. Cavers did much the same
in 1933. See Cavers, supra note 297, at 192-93. Currie observed in 1958 that a forum’s choice of law would
generally be upset by due process or full faith and credit obligations only where the state whose law was applied
had no legitimate interest therein. See Currie, supra note 339, at 75. And although he recognized that the Court
had occasionally weighed the competing state interests, he argued that this was essentially a “political function of
a high order,” not to be undertaken lightly in ordinary adjudication. See id. at 77-78 (urging Congress to utilize its
full faith credit powers to distinguish between sources of foreign law and judgments to be credited specially).
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resource involving rivalrous claims from within different legal systems posed competing
sovereign interests and therefore implied a federal interest in their adjudication. 365 Presumptions
favoring forum law would not do. 366 And in the event some conflict emerged among the
applicable laws, the federal interest—derived from states’ interests in the maximum possible
scope and priority for their own laws consistent with duties to the Union—could only be served
by a proper checking of a forum’s (perhaps biased) application of forum-state law. 367
Litigating such a claim here is beyond our scope. But some implications are plain. First,
assertions of jurisdiction in rem aiming to ‘clear title’ to water rights can easily deny the rights of
other states’ users and thereby deny that state’s equal sovereignty as it has been interpreted by
the Supreme Court. 368 Denying out-of-state claimants a forum to challenge in-state rights is

Cf. Pioneer, 259 U.S. at 502 (noting that “essential and substantial issue in the case” arose from a “federal
constitutional right to transport water” in accordance with law of the place of use); Rickey Land & Cattle, 218 U.S.
at 259-60 (observing that the claims “in respect of each may require a consideration of the other if they are to be
dealt with completely” because “each may be regulated by the state where the land lies according to its sovereign
will”). Notably, in the Ninth Circuit’s famed Brooks case following the Bean, Rickey, and Pioneer trilogy, even after
noting the two states’ quasi-sovereign interests, the court held that neither was an indispensable party. See
Brooks, 119 F.2d at 643.
366
The conflicts revolution surrounding Erie ultimately drew into question any forum state’s careless application of
its own laws to interstate parties or circumstances. Cf. Green, supra note 199, at 1266-71 (reviewing the history of
presumptions in favor of forum law and to the effect that foreign law is identical to forum law). Although the Court
eventually settled on permissive due process standards for choices of law generally, see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague,
449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981), and for assertions of jurisdiction to adjudicate, see Weinstein, supra note 285, at 211-13,
it has long since made clear that, for interstate waters, out-of-state actions affecting forum state interests in the
shared waters can suffice for both inquiries. See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 504 (1971); cf.
Phillips Petro. Co. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-22 & n.8 (1985) (holding that a state must have sufficient “interest” in
a claim to apply its own law to it).
367
Although “it [is] difficult to point to any field in which the Court has more completely demonstrated or more
candidly confessed the lack of guiding standards . . . than in trying to determine what choice of law is required by
the Constitution,” Franchise Tax Bd. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 496 (2003) (quoting Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and
Credit—The Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 16 (1945)), the Court has insisted that states’
interests in their shared waters necessarily require accommodation when rivalrous claims arise. See, e.g., Sporhase
v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956-57 (1982) (noting that “the legal expectation that under certain
circumstances each State may restrict water within its borders” had been “fostered” by equitable apportionments
and the “enforcement of interstate compacts” but that these state interests were surely limited by the State’s
membership in the Union); see supra notes 70-71, 206 and accompanying text.
368
See supra notes 209-16 and accompanying text. Generally, courts may assert jurisdiction over absent
defendants only with appropriate interests, contacts, and notice to the defendant(s). See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner,
365
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likewise unconstitutional. 369 Second, no accommodation of quasi-sovereign interests comes from
simply crediting an intrastate adjudication with conclusive (claim- or issue-preclusive) effects
interstate where those rights deny or diminish the resource contrary to other users’ entitlements
to it. 370 To do so would either deny them their due process 371 or deny the subordinated State its
due as the source of law under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, faith and credit statute, or

433 U.S. 186, 196-207 (1977); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 311-17 (1950).
Furthermore, a state’s interest in allowing its own users of interstate waters the fullest benefits due therefrom
consistent with other valid claims preempts any aggregate cancellation of such rights. See Hinderlider v. La Plata
River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 106-08 (1938); see also Hill, Preemption, supra note 211, at 1076.
369
See, e.g., Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367-71 (1990); First Nat’l Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342
U.S. 396, 399-401 (1952); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 391-94 (1947); Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 639-45
(1935); Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, Loyal Order of Moose, 252 U.S. 411, 414-15 (1920).
370
Unlike the Court’s several escheat cases, where it held that one and only one state could claim intangible
property by escheat, see Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 677 (1965); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S.
71, 75 (1961); Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 443 (1951), shared waters and the (intangible)
entitlements to them are “by nature” shared interstate. See Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 144 (1902).
Jurisdiction to adjudicate conflicts among such entitlements, even assuming they are property rights of some kind,
is therefore not necessarily the exclusive province of some host state where they may be said to “vest.”
371
See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008) (holding that there should be no “public law” “virtual representation”
form of non-party preclusion in federal common law); Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 797-98 (1996)
(holding that “extreme applications” of issue- and claim-preclusion doctrine like those depriving one who lacked
notice of a proceeding from their own adjudication violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); cf.
Restatement (2d), Judgments § 86 (1982) (valid, final judgment of a state court has same preclusive effect in a
subsequent action in federal court as by the law of rendering state except where subsequent action involving
related federal claim or issue arises under a scheme of federal remedies contemplating assertion notwithstanding
adjudication in state court).
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both. 372 In short, although the era of general stream adjudications is closing, 373 if the conclusions
here are correct the proper recognition of those adjudicated rights could easily prompt challenges
to the scope and/or priority of the laws intersecting on interstate waters. 374 The Court’s holdings
on interstate judgment recognition suggest that finality and predictability must occasionally yield
to States’ equal sovereignty and that cross-jurisdictional claims like water rights on shared
waters are one of those instances. 375

This conclusion follows from the Court’s faith and credit doctrines and the bundle of state interests in interstate
waters it has repeatedly held are owed to all states equally. Cf. Green, supra note 199 (arguing that state courts
interpreting the law of a sibling state are under an obligation similar to that levied on federal courts to decide the
issue as would the courts of that state); Florey, supra note 338, at 1115 (“[A] state that ignores due process
guarantees through the heedless application of forum law is generally violating the rights not only of the
defendants in question but of another state.”); Weinstein, supra note 285, at 232-43 (tracing the Supreme Court’s
several forays since the advent of the Federal Rules into due process limitations on jurisdiction to adjudicate). The
Full Faith and Credit statute was amended in 1948 to require “the same full faith and credit in every court within
the United States” for “Acts, records and judicial proceedings” as they receive “by law or usage” in the rendering
state. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2016). And although the Court’s extraterritorial doctrines as to “Acts,” “records,” and
“judicial proceedings” may have fluctuated, see Florey, supra note 338, at 1068-1111, two bedrock principles have
remained fixed. First, state courts adjudicating cases within their jurisdiction are obliged to adjudicate federal
claims and defenses as if they were (superior) forum law. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 390-94 (1947). Second,
parties to be burdened by prior proceedings should not be so burdened if the “forum in the second action affords
[it] procedural opportunities in the presentation and determination of the issue that were not available in the first
action and could likely result in the issue being differently determined.” Restatement (2d) Judgments § 29(2)
(1982); see Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 164 n.11 (1979); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,
330-31 & n.16 (1979).
373
See Colburn, supra note 210, at 63.
374
As is true in general, an F1 judgment rendered in violation of the Constitution is not necessarily entitled to any
“faith and credit,” even in F1. See Graham C. Lilly, The Symmetry of Preclusion, 54 Ohio St. L.J. 289, 303 (1993). The
Court has, however, suggested that the law governing any federal court judgment’s preclusive effects will vary as
between federal question cases, see, e.g., University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478, U.S. 788, 794-95 (1986) (federal
common law), and diversity cases. See, e.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507-09 (2001)
(either state law or federal common law). But it has never suggested deviations from the bedrock exception in
preclusion of claims where claimants were “unable to rely on a certain theory of the case or to seek a certain
remedy or form of relief [in F1] because of the limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts or
restrictions on their authority . . . .” Restatement (2d), Judgments § 26(c) (1982). States’ general stream
adjudications have rarely (if ever) taken up foreign law claims to the water(s).
375
Cf. Richards, 517 U.S. at 798 (noting that the limits on a state court’s power to develop estoppel rules reflect a
“general consensus that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated
as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process”); Taylor, 553 U.S. 901 (noting that a
“diffuse balancing approach to nonparty preclusion would likely create more headaches than it relieves” and
reaffirming that, with few exceptions, non-parties are generally not to face claim- or issue-preclusion from prior
proceedings).
372
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Court came into protecting states’ interests in interstate waters to protect their equal
sovereignty. A long century later and after dozens of such adjudications, the Court’s reasoning
case-by-case has revealed that these quasi-sovereign interests are an amalgam of benefits and
burdens to be shared with sibling states that must be reconciled as they arise in courts of
competent jurisdiction. Assuming these interests arise under the Constitution—and the bulk of
the Court’s relevant holdings suggest that they do—it would deny the Supreme Court’s finality
on questions of constitutional interpretation for any inferior court simply to ignore those interests
in civil litigation that happens not to be wholly intrastate.
Still, the Court’s precedents in both its original and appellate jurisdictions leave much to
other institutions—especially to Congress and to the states themselves. Thus, the path forward on
interstate waters with the fewest snags in the record may be a choice-of-law rubric knitting
together Congress’s authority to make federal laws, the states’ sovereign interests in the broadest
possible scope and priority for their own laws consistent with membership in the Union as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, and all federal courts’ fastidious attention to the limits of all
legal authorities, starting with their own.
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